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ABSTRACT 
Political commentary, including discussion of Indigenous accountability, regarding nation to 
nation relationship building with Canada’s Indigenous nations has increased significantly since 
the federal election in October 2015. However, little academic research exists that assesses how 
prepared Canada’s public administrators are to implement such a vision. This thesis seeks to 
address this gap by exploring the role of accountability in the government’s relationship with 
First Nation communities. In particular, it investigates how the Conservative Government’s 
Indigenous accountability policies changed during their tenure from 2006-2016 and how these 
changes affected the Crown’s relationship with First Nation communities. The evidence 
collected through this project supports the argument that New Public Management, Canada’s 
current model of Public Administration, is fundamentally incapable of fostering an authentic 
nation to nation relationship as envisioned by many First Nation communities and Indigenous 
organizations. Communities remain subservient to the Crown through top-down Ministerial 
accountability, which remains firmly in place ten years later. Moreover, attempts to reduce 
program reporting requirements on First Nation communities has not resulted in any significant 
reduction in their reporting burden. This thesis argues that meaningful engagement with First 
Nation communities is a crucial interim step toward a new administrative framework that enables 
greater Indigenous self-determination.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2006, the newly elected minority Conservative government introduced the Federal 
Accountability Act and the accompanying action plan, as promised during their election 
campaign (Government of Canada, 2006; Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2006). 
However, their focus on accountability and transparency did not end there. They implemented 
further policies affecting First Nation communities, labour unions, and charities after finally 
achieving majority government status in 2011 (Bryden 2015; The Canadian Press 2015; H. King 
2014; Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2015b). With respect to First Nation 
communities, the government passed the First Nation Financial Transparency Act (FNFTA) in 
March 2013. The act requires band councils to publicly post online all financial audits, including 
privately acquired funds within specific timelines, and allowed the government to withhold non-
essential funding should communities fail to comply (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 
2015b).  
Some Indigenous leaders agreed with the FNFTA while others viewed its passing as a 
reassertion of paternalistic power relations between the government and Indigenous peoples (H. 
King 2014). Among their concerns, they believed the act painted an unfair perspective of the 
financial governance practices in First Nation communities. For example, some argued that 
Canadians are unaware the government already had the power to withhold funding to 
communities and many already voluntarily disclosed their financial information to their members 
(H. King 2014; Jones 2015). Moreover, community members could obtain financial information 
by requesting access to annually submitted reports to the federal government (Jones 2015; 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2015b).   Despite the government’s uncertainty, the 
vast majority of communities appropriately manage their finances (Jones 2015; H. King 2014). 
As a result, some Indigenous leaders allege that the act was little more than a strategy to subvert 
their right to self-determination by reinforcing external federal government control over internal 
community affairs (Jones 2015; King 2014).  
Legal challenges quickly ensued after the passage of the FNFTA. The federal 
government exerted its power under the new law to withhold funding and initiated legal action 
against five First Nation communities to force compliance with it. However, the FNFTA’s future 
became uncertain after the election of a majority Liberal government in October 2015.  In 
December 2015, the new Minister of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC), Carolyn 
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Bennett, ordered a halt to “all discretionary compliance measures” under the legislation, a 
reinstatement of withheld funding from Indigenous communities, and the suspension of all legal 
proceedings against non-complying communities (Bennett 2015).  
Groups such as the Conservative opposition and the Canadian Taxpayers Federation, 
among others, criticized the government’s actions on the basis that it reduces financial 
accountability and transparency in First Nation communities (Conservative Party of Canada 
2015; Pedwell 2015). Conversely, several Indigenous leaders praised the government’s actions, 
arguing they never opposed strengthening accountability mechanisms in their communities. 
Rather, they dispute unilaterally imposed government measures that perpetuate historic power 
relations between the Crown and Indigenous peoples. These competing perspectives were 
represented by Chris Alcantara in his 2012 editorial for the Toronto Star. He concluded by 
saying: “Overall, the results of this legislation should be positive in terms of improving 
accountability and transparency between band councils and band members. The same cannot be 
said, however, for the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. (Alcantara 2012). 
Mixed reactions to the FNFTA and Minister Bennett’s changes to it demonstrate that 
accountability is an important aspect of Canada’s relationship with Indigenous peoples. 
However, no concrete details concerning replacement policies have yet been publicly shared. 
Moreover, little academic research exists that assesses how the implementation of the 
Conservative Government’s Indigenous accountability policies changed from previous 
government approaches. This thesis addresses this gap. It evaluates how the federal 
government’s Indigenous accountability policies changed from 2006 to 2016 and discusses its 
impact on the Crown’s relationship with First Nation communities.   
This thesis advances two main arguments. The first argument contends that New Public 
Management is an inadequate model of public administration in fostering an authentic nation-to-
nation relationship with First Nation communities. Under current program arrangements, NPM 
reinforces First Nation community subordination to the Crown through top-down Ministerial 
accountability, despite some reductions to the program reporting burden on First Nation 
communities and some increases in the administrative and policy control over their programs.  
This thesis’s second argument contends that meaningful consultation and engagement of 
First Nation communities is key to the long-term success of any new federal government 
Indigenous accountability framework. Further to this point, the perspectives of off-reserve First 
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Nation community members, particularly urban— and largely younger people — must be 
recognized.  The proportion of off-reserve, urban community members is increasing compared to 
on-reserve members. This trend poses some challenges to the sustainability and legitimacy of 
community governance and funding structures imposed under the Indian Act. In particular, it is 
not clear how urban members remain engaged in their community’s local governance.  It is also 
not obvious how being off-reserve affects the constitutional and legal benefits afforded to these 
members. 
Nation-to-nation relationship and meaningful consultation are defined within the context 
of the two-row wampum belt that some First Nation communities and Indigenous leaders have 
publicly referred to. Michael Asch touched on this definition in his book On Being Here to Stay: 
Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada. He quoted a 1996 letter from the Mohawk Nation 
Council of Chiefs to the Assembly of First Natiosn on their interpretation of the two-row 
wampum belt. They stated: 
We will not be like father and son, but like sisters and brothers. These two rows will 
symbolize vessels, travelling down the same rivers together. One will be for the canoe of 
the Onkwehonwe and their laws, their customs. The other will be for the sailing ship of 
the European people and their laws and customs. We will each travel the river together, 
but each in our own boat, neither of us will try to steer the other’s vessel (Mohawk 
Nation Council of Chiefs 1996).  
 
On a similar vein, The Assembly of First Nations defines a nation-to-nation relationship in the 
context of the Royal Proclamation. They stated:  
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 and Treaties entered into between the Crown and First 
Nations embody a nation‐to‐nation relationship, based on the right of self‐determination 
and the principles of peaceful coexistence and sharing…The Crown and First Nations 
need to reset and renew the relationship, based on the principles of self‐determination and 
the spirit and intent of Treaties, as understood by First Nations. New mechanisms and 
processes need to be put in place to reaffirm and rebuild the nation‐to‐nation relationship 
(Assembly of First Nations 2012, 4). 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, meaningful consultation is rooted in the concept of ‘The 
Honour of the Crown’ as defined by the Supreme Court of Canada in Haida Nation V. British 
Columbia in 2004. The case introduced the concept to Aboriginal law in that the Crown must act 
honourably and in good faith in its dealings with First Nation communities (Isaac 2012; Newman 
2014). That is to say that consultation is not merely a small box on a project checklist. First 
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Nation community perspectives are to be given serious weight in the development and 
implementation of projects that are known to adversely impact their rights.   
This thesis is broken down into six sections. Section one provides a factual overview of 
changes to the federal government’s Indigenous accountability policies since 2006. Section two 
is a review of existing academic literature on Indigenous financial accountability mechanisms, 
and provides this project’s theoretical framework. Section three consists of the project’s 
methodological approach and a description of the methods used. Section four explores 
Indigenous reactions to the First Nation Financial Transparency Act and the government’s 
accountability approach with First Nation communities. Section five explores the perspectives of 
government officials on changes to federal Indigenous accountability policies since 2006. 
Section six concludes this thesis by providing an overall analysis of what these changes mean in 
relation to nation to nation relationship building and consultation with Indigenous peoples, and 
approaches forward. 
CHAPTER 1 -  WHAT CHANGED SINCE 2006? 
 Several administrative reforms were introduced to First Nation funding arrangements 
during the last ten years in response to ongoing criticisms of the government’s funding 
arrangements. Funding arrangements were largely criticized for hindering many First Nations 
from transitioning to self-government despite the implementation of progressive funding 
arrangements in the mid-1980’s1. For instance, in 2002, 2006, and 2011, the Office of the 
Auditor General criticized Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (formerly Aboriginal Affairs 
and Northern Development Canada) for its unnecessarily byzantine funding arrangements that 
included excessive and redundant accountability reporting requirements on First Nation 
communities. Likewise, in 2006, the Treasury Board implemented an Independent Blue Ribbon 
Panel on Grant and Contribution Programs to evaluate how government wide grants and 
contributions funding could be more efficient, which included reporting requirements embedded 
in First Nations funding arrangements. 
 
                                                 
1 The Penner Report on Indian self-government was released in 1983. The report called on the government of the 
day to move towards a grants funding; failing that, they recommended a per capita funding formula for communities 
that would “ensure equity and greatly facilitate disbursement” (Penner 1983, 145). The goal of a new funding 
approach was to enable self-determination and self-government.  
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In 2012, the Conservative government introduced the Reducing the Administrative 
Burden on First Nations Initiative. The initiative aimed to reduce and consolidate the onerous 
administrative requirements that were placed on First Nation communities under INAC’s 
complex funding arrangements. In addition to this initiative, INAC reconfigured their funding 
arrangements to standardize funding arrangements across all regions. Up until that point, funding 
arrangements consisted of four different funding agreements, each of which offered agreement 
specific funding authorities2 that depended on a community or program’s risk level. The old 
funding arrangements are shown in the following table.  
TABLE 1: INAC Funding Arrangements 1980’s – 2010  
Funding Agreement Available Funding 
Agreement Authorities 
Agreement 
Duration 
Contribution Agreement (CA) 1. Contributions Annual 
Comprehensive Funding Arrangement 
(CFA) 
2. Contributions 
3. Flexible Transfer 
Payment (FTP) 
4. Grant 
Annual 
DIAND/Canada-First Nation Funding 
Arrangement (CFNFA) 
1. Alternative Funding 
Arrangement (AFA) 
2. Targeted Funding 
Contributions  
Up to five years  
Self-Government Financial Transfer 
Agreement 
1. Grant  No specific 
duration.  
Source: Shepherd 2006 
Despite the availability of different arrangements under old arrangements, no 
standardized national risk assessment process existed at the time, leading to inconsistent 
interpretations of program risk across INAC regions. Consequently, funding arrangements were 
inconsistently administered across regions. One 2008 INAC report noted that “risk management, 
accountability and flexibility are not well balanced within funding arrangements, either in terms 
of the amount of money involved, the nature of the program, or the capacity of the recipients” 
 
                                                 
2 A funding authority is a tool established by the Treasury Board that authorizes a department to transfer funds to a 
recipient, and it prescribes how those funds can be managed. 
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(Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 2008). Moreover, program design unintendedly restricted 
First Nation communities from progressing to more financially liberal block funding approaches, 
i.e. moving from a contribution agreement to using an Alternative Funding Arrangement (AFA) 
under the Canada-First Nation Funding Agreement that allowed block funding up to five years3.  
 Under their reform initiatives, INAC took several steps to rectify these problems, 
including the development of a standardized risk assessment process called the General 
Assessment (GA). The GA was created with two goals in mind: to standardize program risk 
assessment across all INAC regions, and to re-design previous attempts at incentivizing 
communities to move towards revised block funding arrangements. Under the GA, First Nation 
communities would be assessed as either low, medium, or high risk using a set of standardized 
benchmarks in four different categories: governance, performance history, financial stability, and 
planning and project complexity. The idea being that a community’s final score would inform 
the level of government intervention needed in funding arrangements. For example, communities 
labeled as high-risk would be given less flexible funding arrangements compared to those 
deemed low-risk.  
Funding authorities and funding agreements were simultaneously re-formulated to match 
the standardized and incentivized approach adopted under the General Assessment. Under the 
Treasury Board’s new transfer payments policy in 2008 (that INAC adopted in 2011) new 
funding authorities were created and combined with old ones to offer a total of five funding 
authorities to be consistently applied across all funding agreements. They are: Set, Fixed, 
Flexible, Block, and Grant. The funding agreements were overhauled to accommodate the new 
funding authorities. The combination of these changes, allow for tailored funding compared to 
more rigid arrangements under the previous model. Table 2 and Table 3 below, list the new 
funding authorities and the new funding agreements.   
  
 
                                                 
3 In response to the Penner report, the government introduced the Alternative Funding Arrangement—a block 
funding approach that gave communities greater flexibility in spending program funds. Unfortunately, the uptake 
was low by many communities because it was a fixed-cost approach that didn’t adequately keep pace with rapid 
population growth in communities, resulting in funding shortfalls from increased demand for community services. 
As a result, many communities felt the financial flexibility afforded by the AFA was not worth it.  
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TABLE 2: INAC Funding Agreement 2010 – Present  
 
Type of Agreement 
 
Description 
First Nations and Tribal 
Councils National 
Funding Agreement 
 
• Available to First Nation and tribal council recipients. 
• Considered the “default” and basic agreement, similar to that of the CFA. 
 
Streamlined Funding 
Agreement Model for 
First Nations 
 
• Only available to First Nations communities. New agreement type. 
• An optional agreement that uses plain language, removes complex terminology, 
and reduced delivery terms and conditions.  
Canada Common 
Funding Agreement 
Model 
• A harmonized funding agreement for First Nation communities and Tribal 
Councils that receive funding from Health Canada and INAC. Similar to 
CFNFA. 
• Requires one set of consolidated audited financial statements instead of two, 
and combines, and reduces the recipient reporting requirements of each 
department into one set of requirements. 
 
Plain/Simplified Funding 
Agreement Model for 
Project Funding 
• Similar to the Streamlined Funding Agreement Model for First Nations, but is 
available for funding recipients that are not a First Nation community or Tribal 
Council, and is for proposal-based funding.  
• Used when a funding recipient does not have any other agreement in place with 
INAC. Similar to Contributions Agreement (CA). 
 
Funding Agreement 
Model for Other 
Recipients 
• Used for program, project, or service delivery by a recipient other than First 
Nation communities and tribal councils (with the exception self-governing First 
Nations for programs, projects and services not covered by their agreement).  
Source: Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2016 
 
TABLE 3: Funding Authorities under the Treasury Board’s 2008 Policy on Transfer Payments 
Funding 
Authority 
Key Attributes Duration 
Grant 
 (Same as Grant) 
• Can be used in any manner related to the program, project, 
or initiative being funded.  
• No performance conditions.  
• Unspent funds remain with the recipient. 
 
Any duration  
Set 
(Same as 
Contribution) 
• Funding must be spent as stipulated in the funding 
agreement and cannot be transferred to any other program, 
project, or service.  
• Strict performance measurement conditions apply. 
• Unspent funds (if applicable) must be returned.  
 
Annual  
Fixed 
(Revisions to 
FTP) 
• Funding is based on a formula or a fixed-cost basis.  
• Funds cannot be transferred to other projects or programs, 
unless authorized.  
• Surpluses may be retained by the recipient, and carried 
forward and applied to the same program. 
 
 
Annual  
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Flexible 
(Variant of FTP) 
• Funds can be used within the same cost-categories of the 
program being funded.  
• An established relationship of two years must exist 
between the donor and recipient.  
• Available to communities with a lower range General 
Assessment score. 
• Unspent funds remaining upon expiry must be returned. 
 
Multi-year – Up to 10 
years  
Block 
(Revisions to 
AFA) 
• Funds can be redistributed and reallocated to other 
programs within the block as identified in the funding 
agreement.  
• Available to communities with a lower range General 
Assessment score. 
• Unspent funds may be retained, and re-allocated to other 
projects or programs in the block. 
Multi-year – Up to 10 
years. 
Source: Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2011a 
 
In addition to these new arrangements, INAC introduced several short-term proposal 
based programs, which is particularly evident in the department’s education programs.  Under 
the elementary and secondary education program area, there are four complementary sub- 
programs all of which are restricted to the set funding authority, the least flexible of the five 
funding authorities (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2015c). The four programs are: 
• High Cost Special Education Program 
• New Paths for Education 
• Education Partnerships Program 
• First Nation Student Success Program 
The general objective of these complementary programs is to support core education funding by 
providing targeted financial resources to improve literacy, numeracy, and student retention.  
CHAPTER 2 – FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
Existing Literature and Theory  
The lack of research concerning accountability in the Indigenous context is particularly 
acute. Only a handful of Canadian scholars have touched on this subject in any meaningful way, 
including Ken Coates at the University of Saskatchewan; Robert Shepherd, Frances Abele, and 
Hayden King at Carleton University; Chris Alcantara at the University of Western Ontario, 
Michael Prince at the University of Victoria and, Shin Imai at York University (Abele and Prince 
2003; Coates 2008; Alcantara, Spicer, and Leone 2012; Alcantara 2012; Shepherd 2006; Imai 
2007; H. King 2014). Robert Shepherd’s 2006 PhD dissertation aligns closest with this research 
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subject. His work represents my initial ideas on this subject. I was also referred to his work by 
Dr. Frances Abele of Carleton University.  Lastly, the completion of Shepherd’s doctorate in 
2006 provides a solid reference point to evaluate changes to the federal government’s Indigenous 
accountability policies under the tenure of the previous government4. 
Shepherd’s dissertation investigated the balance between the federal government’s 
external control over local Indigenous community governance and the internal control of 
community members over their local band government. He framed his work under the context of 
public administrative reform in Canada, specifically the shift from Traditional Public 
Administration to New Public Management.  Shepherd evaluated this balance using adapted 
versions of Barbara Romzek and Melvin Dubnick’s four sub-types of accountability: 
professional, political, bureaucratic and performance (Romzek and Dubnick 1987; Romzek 
2000). However, he referred to hierarchical as bureaucratic and legal as performance (Shepherd 
2006, 59). This thesis is based on a simplified version of Robert Shepherd’s theoretical 
framework. Only Romzek and Dubnick’s bureaucratic and performance accountability sub-types 
are used instead of all four. Both are analyzed under the context of New Public Management.  
Bureaucratic accountability is a traditional administrative approach to achieving 
accountability through strictly defined hierarchies, including superior-subordinate relationships 
(Romzek and Dubnick 1987). Shepherd (2006) noted that bureaucratic accountability is based on 
“close supervision of individuals who have low work autonomy and are subject to strict internal 
command and control based on explicit rules and regulations” (Shepherd 2006, 63). Under this 
approach, Indigenous communities were viewed as extensions of the Department of Indian 
Affairs instead of more localized and autonomous organizations. This resulted in strict 
administrative and policy control by the government (Shepherd 2006). Shepherd further noted, 
“Executive directives, administrative program checklists and guidelines, and narrow span of 
supervision exemplify control within this accountability type” (2006, 64).  
Performance accountability is a product of administrative reform that saw a shift towards 
a results-based approach under New Public Management. The use of centralized performance 
accountability mechanisms is a key element of New Public Management. In theory, they allow 
for increased autonomy in the delivery of programs and services at the local level; however, the 
 
                                                 
 The previous Conservative Federal Government was in power from February 2006 – October 2015.  
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performance or effectiveness of these programs and services are evaluated against a set of 
centralized measures typically developed at the senior management or executive level. Romzek 
and Dubnick note:  
In the bureaucratic system, the relationship is hierarchical and based on the ability of 
supervisors to reward or punish subordinates. In legal [performance] accountability, 
however, the relationship is between two relatively autonomous parties and involves a 
formal or implied fiduciary (principal/agent) agreement between the public agency and 
its legal overseer (Romzek & Dubnick 1987, 229). 
 
Canada’s First Nation communities operate under dual accountability: they are both 
accountable to the federal government and their community members. Shepherd applied dual 
accountability as an overlay over Romzek and Dubnick’s four accountability sub-types. He 
defined the communities’ accountability relationship with the Crown as ‘contingent’ and their 
relationship with their community members as ‘inherent’, which is visualized below.   
 
 
 Contingent and Inherent accountability can be seen as a proverbial tug-of-war between 
the Crown’s accountability demands on First Nation community governments and the 
accountability demands of First Nation community members on their local government. This 
Indigenous 
Community 
Members 
(Principal) 
Contingent and Inherent Accountability with Romzek and Dubnick’s Sub-types 
Bureaucratic 
Performance 
Professional 
Political 
Contingent 
Local 
Indigenous  
Government 
(Agent) 
Bureaucratic 
Performance 
Professional 
Political 
Federal 
Government 
(Principal) 
Inherent 
 TENSION 
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causes competition between the accountability demands of the federal government and the First 
Nation community members (Abele & Prince, 2003; Alcantara et al., 2012; Coates, 2008; Imai, 
2007; Shepherd, 2006).  Not only do they represent the spatial direction of the accountability 
relationship, they highlight the sources of control and authority to which the agent is 
accountable. The agent, the principal, sources of control, and degrees of control are well-
documented in accountability literature. Staffan Lindberg (2009) assessed the literature to 
determine shared elements of accountability. He found the following five high-level 
characteristics: 
 
1. An agent or institution who is to give an account (A for agent);  
2. An area, responsibilities, or domain subject to accountability (D for domain);  
3. An agent or institution to whom A is to give account (P for principal);  
4. The right of P to require A to inform and explain/justify decisions with regard to D; 
and,  
5. The right of P to sanction A if A fails to inform and/or explain/justify decisions with 
regard to D (8). 
 
Lindberg’s general set of conditions demonstrate that accountability is both expressed as a 
relationship and a process (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Shepherd, 2006; Stone, 1995). For 
instance, the agent outlined in characteristic one has an accountability relationship with the 
principal identified in characteristic three. Furthermore, processes are discernible in 
characteristic five where the principal evaluates the agent’s actions against a set of standards, 
procedures or expectations.  
  In relation to Canada’s Indigenous accountability policies, Shepherd found that 
bureaucratic and performance accountability constitute the predominant sub-types observed in 
the contingent accountability profile (Shepherd 2006). He noted: 
With regard to bureaucratic accountability, arrangements between government and First 
Nations focus on the processes of service delivery. Performance accountability focuses 
on outputs and outcomes. In both cases, the accountability relationship between First 
Nations and federal and provincial/territorial donors is “contingent” upon adhering to 
established rules and procedures outlined in funding and other administrative 
arrangements (60). 
 
Shepherd found that the Crown’s performance and bureaucratic accountability measures within 
First Nation communities reinforce top-down Ministerial accountability. He explained that 
“funding and other benefits of the federal and provincial Crowns are contingent upon respecting 
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governmental accountability requirements”. As a result, he believes contingent accountability is 
a “specific understanding and application of Ministerial accountability as it relates to First 
Nations” (Shepherd 2006, 61). Ministerial accountability refers to the hierarchical path of 
accountability from the bureaucracy up to the Minister, who is accountable to Parliament and, 
ultimately, the public. In this arrangement, the public is seen as the principal (the source of 
authority to govern).  Politicians are the actors who are carrying out the authority to govern 
granted by the electorate.  
 Shepherd explains that inherent accountability can take on different arrangements 
depending on the community. He found that “traditional practices or processes consistent with 
past practice” often inform the design of modern day community accountability processes (61).  
Furthermore, he found that a community’s traditionally based accountability framework overlaid 
the imposed administrative system required by outside governments” (2006, 61/62). Specifically, 
these are imposed electoral and administrative systems under the Indian Act in this case.  
Shepherd’s research concluded that government control over First Nation communities 
increased in spite of greater community delivery of federal government programs and services. 
Under New Public Management, performance-based reporting requirements were instituted as a 
condition of funding during administrative reform. However, these accountability requirements 
blurred the lines between Traditional Public Administration and New Public Management. 
Government scrutiny over First Nation community affairs actually increased as they had to 
“demonstrate that they have achieved donor results on a program-by-program basis” (2006, 73). 
This approach is based on New Public Management’s focus on private sector ideals and 
centralized corporate control over policy development and implementation. However, corporate 
control is exerted through traditional bureaucratic management arrangements. Shepherd notes: 
 
Overall, these governmental preferences have been framed in part by NPM that 
emphasizes strong central policy control and higher efficiency through privatization and 
devolution of responsibilities. Such constant pressure to ensure costs are contained have 
informed most public sector management decisions with respect to First Nations 
governance. Such preferences are evident in the manner the federal government has 
framed its accountability relationship with First Nations under conditions of devolution 
and its shift of attention to results versus process. In this respect, the motivation for 
strong federal control has remained virtually unchanged from the TPA management 
orientation (Shepherd 2006, 420-421). 
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Ultimately, Shepherd found that the accountability relationship between First Nation 
communities and the federal government was based on the community’s compliance with the 
terms and conditions of their funding agreements instead of demonstrating actual program and 
service performance (Shepherd 2006, 433).  
CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS  
Data for this project was collected through a combination of semi-structured interviews 
and document analysis. Semi-structured interviews improve upon the depth of information and 
insights found through document analysis. They allow participants to explain their experiences 
and stories regarding a given phenomenon. They also allow the researcher to respectfully probe 
for further explanation since the researcher is not bound by a set of strict questions (Clandinin 
and Connelly 1996). As a result, information that was not originally anticipated can add richness 
to the overall dataset.  
Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing and evaluating both printed 
and electronic documents. It requires that data be examined and interpreted in order to draw 
meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge (Bowen 2009). Through a 
process of skimming, reading, and interpretation; document analysis allows researchers to 
identify “meaningful and relevant passages of text or other data” (Bowen 2009). However, 
documents must be critically analyzed as not all are precise, accurate, and complete. Bowen 
(2009) notes “It is necessary, as well, to determine the authenticity, credibility, accuracy and 
representativeness of the selected documents” (33).  
Document analysis is most effective when used in combination with other data collection 
methods (24). For example, semi-structured interviews and document analysis are a 
complementary set of research methods and proved to be a successful combination for this 
project. In this case, an analysis of select gray literature from Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Canada allowed for a targeted approach to interview participant selection, the development of 
insightful interview questions and more relevant interview probing. 
Interviews 
Four semi-structured interviews were conducted with senior officials from the 
Department of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, including two from the head office in 
Gatineau, QC and two from INAC’s Saskatchewan regional office in Regina, SK. Convenience 
and snowball non-probability sampling methods were used to identify appropriate interview 
14 
 
participants within INAC. Initial contact with departmental officials came through a professional 
contact of Ken Coates, this project’s faculty advisor, who facilitated formal introductions with 
other civil servants relevant to this project in the department. 
Initially, only three INAC perspectives were sought from the department’s head office in 
Gatineau, QC. However, it was apparent that regional perspectives were needed after the first 
two interviews with officials from the head office to better understand how changes to 
accountability policies impacted ground operations and how First Nation communities reacted to 
them. As a result, two counterbalancing regional perspectives were sought from Saskatchewan’s 
regional office in Regina, SK. During the project’s data analysis phase, it was clear that both 
perspectives were critical in providing a more comprehensive understanding of how the 
government’s Indigenous accountability policies changed over the last ten years.  
Semi-structured interview questions with INAC officials were categorized into three 
themes: reporting requirements; balance of federal government accountability and local 
autonomy; and participatory governance. The first two themes measured how the federal 
government’s policy and administrative control changed since 2006.  The third theme was used 
to gauge, in a preliminary manner, the extent of digital online participation in community 
governance.  Government officials were each asked the same set of questions; however, open-
ended discussion followed each line of questioning which included follow-up questions that were 
tailored to their initial responses.   
 Questions under the reporting requirements theme measured the effectiveness of  
government efforts to reduce the administrative burden on First Nation  
communities from 2006-2016. INAC officials were asked to walk through the major steps the 
department had taken to streamline program reporting requirements for First Nation 
communities. Secondary questions asked whether these efforts reduced the overall number of 
reporting requirements on First Nation communities, and the approximate number of reports 
required from the average community.  
 The second line of inquiry measured how government efforts balanced federal 
accountability requirements with the local needs of First Nation communities.  INAC officials 
were asked three main questions under this theme. Officials were first asked to describe 
acceptable accountability standards that they look for when developing funding agreements. 
They were then asked whether First Nation community authority over administrative policies had 
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increased or decreased over the last ten years. The final question asked if the department’s 
accountability policies implemented over the last ten years were bureaucratically based or 
performance evaluation based, or a mix of both5. Secondary questions to the third main question 
asked officials to provide some examples of either policy type, and how the First Nations 
Financial Transparency Act (FNFTA) fit into either category.  
 The third line of inquiry focused on participatory governance, and the inclusion of First 
Nation perspectives in policy development. Officials were asked two main questions. The first 
asked whether any digital technologies were used with First Nation communities to solicit their 
participation in federal policy development concerning First Nation governance, and if so, the 
prevalence. The second main question asked if there was a future role for or growth in digital 
technology in strengthening First Nation community participation in federal policy development 
concerning First Nation governance.  
Document Analysis 
Document analysis was the sole source of information relating to Indigenous perspectives 
on the FNFTA, and provided helpful context around changes to the federal government’s 
Indigenous accountability policies. In particular, meeting minutes from the House of Commons 
Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development and the Senate Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal People were used.  Both committee’s provided a multi-day platform 
for Indigenous individuals to express their perspective on the Bill C-27, the First Nations 
Financial Transparency Act.  
Witnesses for each standing committee consisted of politicians, bureaucrats,  
representatives from Indigenous organizations, First Nation community leaders and their support 
staff, and First Nation community members. To ensure an equal representation of Indigenous 
voices, the perspective of a national Indigenous organization6, a First Nation community leader, 
and a First Nation community member were used for this project. A number of representatives 
 
                                                 
5 Definitions of bureaucratic and performance are provided in the literature review section.   
6 An national Indigenous organization for the purposes of this project are the five national Indigenous representative 
organizations recognized by the Government of Canada: the Assembly of First Nations, the Native Women’s 
Association of Canada, the Metis Nation Council, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, and the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples. 
While imperfect, a national Indigenous organization is preferred over smaller organizations as they have a wide base 
to represent.  
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for each category were available between both committees, which is highlighted in the following 
table.  
Table #1: Bill C-27 Witness List by National Indigenous Organization, First Nation Community 
Leaders, and First Nation Community Members.  
National Indigenous 
Organization 
First Nation Community 
Leader 
Community Member 
Jody Wilson-Raybould, 
Regional Chief 
Assembly of First Nations 
Chief Roland Twinn   
Sawridge First Nation  
Michael Benedict 
Odanak First Nation 
Ron Swain, National Vice 
Chief 
Congress of Aboriginal 
Peoples 
Councillor Clarence 
Paupanekis 
Norway House Cree First 
Nation 
Beverly Brown, Appearing as 
an individual 
Squamish First Nation 
 Chief Darcy Bear 
Whitecap Dakota First 
Nation 
John G. Paul  
Membertou First Nation 
 Craig Makinaw, 
Confederacy of Treaty Six 
First Nations 
 
Source: (House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development 2016; Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 2016) 
The perspectives of Jody Wilson Raybould, Chief Darcy Bear, and Beverly Brown were 
selected to represent the three strata of Indigenous perspectives. The Assembly of First Nations, 
as represented by Wilson-Raybould, was selected as it represents status First Nation 
communities. This is important as the FNFTA does not apply to Metis or non-status First Nation 
peoples, which the Congress of Aboriginal Peoples represents. Wilson-Raybould’s multiple 
testimonies also provide a more comprehensive examination of the government’s Indigenous 
accountability approach beyond Bill C-27.  
 Chief Darcy Bear from Saskatchewan was selected for his balanced perspective on Bill 
C-27, which is favored over the other more extreme views. Secondly, John Duncan, the former 
Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada, stated in his committee 
testimonies that Chief Bear was a key figure involved in consultation for Bill C-27. However, as 
explored in section four and five, it was found that little to no national consultation occurred for 
Bill C-27. Interestingly, despite Chief Bear’s support for Bill C-27’s spirit and intent, his 
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testimony touched on the importance of First Nation self-determination, something critics 
believe the proposed legislation restricted.  
The general criteria for selecting the perspective of an individual First Nation community 
member was to find the most average case possible.  Beverly Brown matched this criteria better 
than the other three. Michael Benedict would have been the next choice had Ms. Brown not 
testified.  Unfortunately, he had previous ties with the Assembly of First Nations and there was 
less public information available regarding his perspectives compared to Ms. Brown. John Paul 
was not selected given Membertou First Nation is an exceptional case for accountability and 
transparency. Since 2002, Membertou’s governance practices have complied with the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the first Indigenous government in the 
world to do so (National Centre for First Nations Governance 2013). While this is an incredible 
success story, it is not representative of the governance practices of the average First Nation in 
Canada.  
 While no perfect sampling methodology exists for qualitative research, there are some 
steps researchers can take to improve their approach. Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney 
Verba discuss this in their book Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative 
Research. They argue that the logic behind causal inference is the same between quantitative and 
qualitative research and; subsequently, they believe that “both quantitative and qualitative 
research can be systematic and scientific” (G. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 4-5).  
However, to what extent should quantitative methods inform qualitative research, 
particularly in the context of Indigenous related research or community based-participatory 
research? Existing literature related to this project suggests convenience and snow-ball sampling 
are the most reasonable sampling approaches with Indigenous related research. Unfortunately, 
selection bias is inherent and a challenge to mitigate when using these sampling frames. Indeed, 
as King, Keohane, and Verba suggest, a researcher should always be self-aware and conscious of 
their sampling selection criteria. Specifics aside, their general argument is that cases should be 
selected to represent the most average scenario possible. However, the reality remains that those 
who conduct Indigenous related research are restricted to the few First Nation communities that 
are willing to participate, or the few public perspectives available, as was the eventual case with 
this project.  Resentment and distrust towards western academic research remains strong among 
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First Nation communities— a legacy of colonialism. Given these realities this thesis is unable to 
make any generalizable claims over all Indigenous perspectives.  
In terms of how committee meeting minutes were analyzed, each testimony was coded 
for evident themes. Common themes from each perspective were then analyzed to inform a 
general Indigenous reaction to the First Nation Financial Transparency Act. Preset themes 
followed the interview guide for INAC officials, which were broadly focused on the tension 
between government control and community self-determination, which was evident in all of the 
testimonies. However, document analysis for gray literature was more factual in nature. Most of 
INAC’s documents were reviewed for factual information concerning the department’s risk 
evaluation tools and processes , different funding models, and how different funding policies 
worked.  
Ethics 
 An ethics review exemption request was submitted to the University’s Behavioural 
Research Ethics Board. It was requested under the purview of Article 2.5 of the Tri-council’s 
2014 Policy Statement on Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans. Under Article 2.5, 
proposed research that consists of “Quality assurance and quality improvement studies, program 
evaluation activities, and performance reviews, or testing within normal educational 
requirements when used exclusively for assessment, management or improvement purposes, do 
not constitute research for the purposes of this policy, and do not fall within the scope of REB 
review” (Government of Canada Interagency Advisory Panel on Research Ethics 2014, 19).  
The exemption was requested on the basis that the project was an evaluation of the level 
of government control in the development and implementation of INAC’s financial 
accountability policies, and the collected data was be used to inform alternative policy 
approaches.  Initially, the project called for interviews with First Nation band employees; 
however, public committee meeting transcripts concerning the FNFTA were analyzed since all 
First Nation communities that were approached declined involvement or did not respond to 
requests for participation. As a result, no immediate harm or risk was presented to First Nation 
communities or Indigenous organizations given all knowledge was publicly available. Similarly, 
policy evaluations of a similar nature had been conducted in the past by INAC as part of their 
routine policy evaluation process (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2011a; Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada 2008).   
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CHAPTER 4 –INIDGENOUS ACCOUNTABILITY POLICIES, 2006-2016 
  
Strong Indigenous reactions to the FNFTA demonstrate the Crown’s accountability 
relationship with First Nation communities goes far beyond the legislation. In fact, it represents a 
deep-rooted and systemic power imbalance between First Nation communities and the Crown. 
Robert Shepherd’s 2006 research on self-governance concluded that federal government control 
over First Nation communities had actually increased despite a greater devolution of program 
responsibilities to band governments. The cause for this increase was a complex mix of 
standardized performance-based evaluation measures and top-down administrative procedures 
that did not allow for much deviation. As a result, a “one size fits all” approach was taken with 
First Nation community accountability and transparency policies that is in conflict with the great 
diversity among Indigenous communities. Little has changed since 2006.  
 Four senior civil servants at the Department of Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 
(INAC) were interviewed to gauge changes in the federal government’s accountability policies 
since 2006. Two were interviewed from INAC’s head office in Gatineau, QC and two were 
interviewed from Saskatchewan’s regional office in Regina, SK. The interviews were conducted 
in the spring and summer months of 2016.  Each participant was given the same set of questions 
(see Addendum 1). The questions were categorized into three themes: reporting requirements, 
balance of federal government accountability and local autonomy, and participatory governance. 
The first two themes were used to measure how the federal government’s policy and 
administrative control changed since 2006.  The third theme was used to assess the extent to 
which communities use technology in fostering member participation in community governance.   
Reporting Requirements 
 In 2002, 2006, and 2011, the Auditor General of Canada (AG) reported that INAC’s 
program reporting requirements placed an excessive administrative burden on First Nation 
communities. The Auditor General also noted a trend which saw the use of more audit-based 
program evaluation over performance-based evaluation. In other words, program evaluation 
became less about measuring how well programs achieved their objectives, and ultimately how 
to improve program performance, and became more about ensuring centralized financial targets 
were met. The AG department has not subsequently looked at the matter in a systematic manner. 
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In response to the 2011 AG report, the federal government launched its Reducing the 
Administrative Burden on First Nations initiative in 2012.  The initiative was a multi-faceted 
approach that involved three distinct priorities:  
 
1. Consolidate and reduce program reporting requirements on First Nation communities;  
2. Develop and implement an incentive based funding system that rewarded communities 
with strong financial records through more flexible funding arrangements; and  
3. Re-focus the accountability relationship away from the government and back to 
community members (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2012).  
 
 Since the initiative launched, INAC claims the department “reduced the number of ad-
hoc reports from 4800 to 800”, according to a 2012 Deputy Minister’s progress report. Likewise, 
a 2014 progress report claims the department also reduced the number of “data collection 
instruments” for non-financial reporting by 65% since the 2012/13 fiscal year (Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada 2012). (Note: data collection instruments are, for all intents and 
purposes, simply program reports.) 
  According to the department, reducing the reporting burden included consolidating and 
streamlining the year-end reporting handbook with the recipient reporting guide into one 
document, which is now referred to as the reporting guide. Prior to the consolidation, the year-
end reporting guide was used to fulfill reporting requirements under a community’s funding 
agreement. Similarly, the separate recipient reporting guide was used to fulfill the reporting 
requirements for individual programs the community delivered on behalf of the department 
(Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2013a). Other approaches included more flexibility in 
the reporting timelines. One civil servant interviewed explained their perspective on the 
initiative’s first stage: 
[G]etting rid of the unnecessary stuff… was the first step. The second thing we did was 
we consolidated reports and we did that kind of two ways. In some cases, certain 
programs required six reports or five, or whatever. We aggregated those. So that saved us 
a lot, you know, just if you think about the tombstone information—consolidating that 
saved steps (INAC 3, Personal Communication, July 13, 2016). 
 
 All four of the INAC senior civil servants interviewed agreed that the department’s initial 
administration reduction efforts resulted in a decrease to the overall number of program reports 
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required from First Nation communities. However, three of them disputed the department’s 
claim that the overall administrative burden had been significantly reduced under the initiative.  
One civil-servant explained that few reductions were made beyond the initial consolidation and 
purge. They stated:  
There has been some. That initial purge where we got rid of the stuff that was absolutely 
“What are we collecting this for?” …excellent work I thought and really got us 
somewhere. The idea of amalgamating all the reports under one heading? There’s a little 
bit of savings there […] My point being really, I think on the surface it looks like a 
significant reduction because, you know, those 80 data elements that we’re collecting on 
a monthly basis, we’re now only collecting quarterly but we’re still collecting 80 data 
elements and you still, as a band manager, you still need to track them (INAC 3, Personal 
Communication, July 13, 2016).  
Another civil servant described the reaction they received from First Nation communities in 
response to the reduction initiative. They stated: “And we go to communities and say ‘Yah, we 
reduced the number of reports’. The response we got back ‘Yah, you took away the one-hundred 
1-page reports that we had to do and gave us ten 100-page reports we have to do’” (INAC 4, 
Personal Communication, July 13, 2016). They argued that INAC’s reduction initiative simply 
made the process more complex by “re-formatting and repackaging” how reporting requirements 
were delivered. However, the third civil servant was more blunt in their assessment, 
characterizing it as “just the moustache on the same old process” (INAC 1, Personal 
Communication, May 18, 2016). 
 While the actual reporting burden appears to have decreased very little under the 
initiative, one civil servant challenged a commonly held perception that a lot of data goes unused 
by departmental staff. In terms of education programming, for instance, they noted that a 
significant amount of information is required. In response to challenges from First Nation 
communities asking why they needed so much information, they stated: “If you’re going to fund 
an education system, you need to know how many kids there are, what grade they’re in, you 
know, if their teacher’s certified as a teacher in the system, if the bus driver’s got insurance, you 
know it’s kind of normal stuff that any school division would need” (INAC 3, Personal 
Communication, July 13, 2016). They later stated: “and it’s hard to reduce much more than that, 
unless we found a completely different mechanism that was based on… I don’t know what” 
(INAC 3, Personal Communication, July 13, 2016).  
 INAC does not currently have a consolidated national database to store all submitted 
reports from First Nation communities despite some attempts. While some program specific 
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databases do exist, such as the Integrated Capital Management System (ICMS) for infrastructure, 
the Education Information System (EIS), and the Grants and Contributions Information 
Management System, they do not feed into a central database (Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Canada 2013b). According to one civil servant, reports are still submitted as electronically 
populated PDF documents that are stored at INAC’s regional offices on encrypted drives. They 
explained data security remains an issue behind the slow transition to full online reporting from 
all communities. They noted: “We’re getting a few folks started but not nearly as many as we’d 
like, and a lot of that has to do with data security because we’re dealing with some fairly 
sensitive information” (INAC 3, Personal Communication, July 13, 2016).  Without a 
more streamlined reporting system, submitting program information remains cumbersome and 
time consuming for all communities. 
Administrative and Policy Control  
 The second phase of the administrative burden reduction initiative saw the development 
and implementation of an incentivized funding model. Communities labeled as high-risk would 
be given less flexible funding arrangements compared to those deemed low-risk.7  A 
community’s risk would be assessed through the newly developed General Assessment, a tool 
that looked at several factors related to a community’s overall governance. As one civil servant 
explained:  
The general assessment is an evaluation that is done in partnership with the First Nation 
on various lines—delivering of lands and economic development sources, delivering of 
education, government structure, all of the different pieces. Then at the end of it, there is 
a general assessment score that is intended to drive the level of intervention that the 
Government of Canada needs to have over a specific community’s affairs (INAC 1, 
Personal Communication, May 18, 2016).  
 
A community’s general assessment score would then be used to determine the appropriate 
funding arrangement with the community. New funding authorities were created alongside the 
creation of the general assessment.  
 Little flexibility existed within community funding agreements before the new funding 
models and the GA were introduced under the reduction initiative. Developed in 2008 and 
 
                                                 
7 Increased flexibility could essentially mean more leeway in shifting funds between programs based on community 
needs or carrying funds over from one fiscal year to another.  
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implemented in 2011, the Treasury Board of Canada’s new policy on transfer payments 
introduced three new “funding authorities”  specifically for First Nation communities 
(Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2011a) (Note: funding authorities can be thought of as 
the different mechanisms that Treasury Board uses to authorize financial transfers from 
government departments to external bodies. Each authority has different administrative 
procedures and restrictions attached to it). These additional authorities were developed as a way 
to reward fiscally responsible communities and incentivize improvement among others. The 
three new authorities— block, fixed, and flexible— do this by allowing greater financial 
flexibility at the First Nation community level with how funding can be spent under their 
agreements with INAC. (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2011b). The set funding 
approach already existed and was the primary mechanism used in previous funding agreements. 
With the addition of three new contribution authorities, Canada now has five different funding 
authorities available for funding agreements: grant, set, fixed, flexible and block (see Addendum 
3 for a fully detailed description of each).   
Under a grant authority, recipients are essentially given a set amount of funding that does 
not need to be accounted for except for reports on end results. Grant arrangements are rare in 
funding agreements with First Nation communities. To the best of the knowledge of one civil 
servant, there is only one such arrangement in Canada, which is with Miawpukek First Nation at 
Conne River in Newfoundland. Under a set funding authority— the standard historical 
approach— funding to communities is subject to strict accounting procedures and audits.  
Unspent money is sent back to the department at the end of each fiscal year.  
The fixed authority gives communities the possibility of keeping any unspent funds as 
long as the department agrees with how it is used the following year.  The flexible authority, 
while similar to the fixed arrangement, allows funding to be moved within the “cost categories” 
of a specific program during the life of the project or agreement. However, this authority allows 
for multi-year projects and agreements unlike the fixed approach.  Unspent money must also be 
returned at the end of the project or agreement’s term.  The block funding authority is the most 
liberal authority after grants and allows for funds to be re-allocated across programs. Funds do 
not have to be returned as long as they are used within the objectives of the agreement or if the 
department approves another purpose.  (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2011b).  
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All four civil-servants agreed that the new funding authorities increased the level of First 
Nations administrative and policy control over their programming and service delivery. They 
also all agreed that the government’s policy approach with First Nation communities has become 
increasingly performance evaluation-based. However, there are exceptions to both changes. One 
civil servant believed that a newly instituted investigative unit within INAC was a bureaucratic 
approach as it layered in various forensic audits for communities that were subject to 
investigation. They stated:  
Is somebody managing correctly? Well that’s a management audit and we’d have to say 
that. So we kind of layered that on and there’s forensic audits and they’ll do scoping 
exercises and all that seems to me a little bit bureaucratic, and us taking on an 
investigative role that I’m not sure is really our mandate (INAC 3, Personal 
Communication, July 13, 2016).  
 
Another civil servant acknowledged that, despite government initiatives to develop more 
horizontal performance based measures, the accountability relationship is still top-down from the 
Minister to communities. They stated: “When you look at it, all our accountabilities haven’t 
changed. So when performance evaluation time comes or you got to get reports done, it’s straight 
up and down” (INAC 4, Personal Communication, July 13, 2016). As a result, it appears 
communities remain subject to elements of both Traditional Public Administration and New 
Public Management. 
Lastly, one civil-servant, who was directly involved in developing the General 
Assessment, explained that its implementation does not reflect the original intention. They 
explained that the reporting requirements for low-risk communities and high-risk communities 
have largely remained the same:  
In my mind when we put the General Assessment in place, the vision was the lower the 
risk, the lower the number of reports…and that never happened. The low-risk community 
has the exact same reporting as a high-risk community. If anybody tells you any different, 
they’re not… they don’t know how the system works (INAC 3, Personal Communication, 
July 13, 2016). 
 
They explained that INAC insists on using the “set” funding authority in many programs, the 
most inflexible of the new funding authorities associated with the General Assessment. They 
stated: “If national programs are going to insist on using the set funding authority for every 
community, irrespective of their risk, we’re never going to get there” (INAC 3, Personal 
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Communication, July 13, 2016).  In spite of internal discussion within INAC to re-visit the GA, 
they had not seen or heard of any planned action at the time of the interview in July 2016. 
 New Public Management remains a flawed approach to nation-to- nation relationship 
building, despite positive changes associated with the new funding authorities. INAC still retains 
ultimate control over how the authorities are implemented. As explained by one civil servant, the 
General Assessment was not implemented as intended. This same civil servant believed that 
another system would be needed to move beyond burdensome reporting measures. The top-down 
command and control management structure which Shepherd observed in 2006 remains in place 
ten years later. Moving towards an authentic nation- to- nation relationship or even towards 
better government-First Nations relations, requires a significant re-configuration of the current 
administrative framework. Otherwise, it appears that small changes will not shift existing 
subordinate power relations in any meaningful way.  
FNFTA and First Nation Community Consultation  
 The First Nations Financial Transparency Act was the result of the administrative burden 
reduction initiative’s third priority. The purpose of which was to shift the accountability 
relationship away from the Crown to First Nation community members. Some civil servants 
described this as “re-defining the accountability bargain”. The FNFTA’s requirement to post all 
consolidated audits online was seen as a step in this direction. All of the civil servants 
interviewed explained that the FNFTA was based on the content of existing funding agreements 
with the exception that audits be posted online and that punitive measures were now enforceable 
under law.  
 Some communities disagreed with the lack of consultation behind the FNFTA.  As a 
result, they refused to comply in posting their audits on their website as stipulated under the Act. 
Despite this, they were still required to privately submit their audits to INAC under their funding 
agreements. If the audits were not submitted, they were subject to INAC’s Default Prevention 
Management Process even if their audits demonstrated good financial management. One civil 
servant described the problems this caused with communities that they knew were good fiscal 
managers. They explained it was a difficult position to be in as they had an established positive 
relationship with most of the communities they worked with. They explained that if a community 
submitted their audit as required under their funding agreement, they had no choice but to post it 
on the INAC website: 
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So First Nations were kind of caught here. If they were objecting to the First Nations 
Financial Transparency Act, they couldn’t give us their audited financial statement and 
say “Here, this satisfies the requirements of the funding agreement but don’t put it on the 
website”. Well they could say that to us but I’m bound by the law and the law says I have 
to put it on the website. You know, it’s communities we worked with forever, so they’re 
not lying to us or anything like that (INAC 3, Personal Communication, July 13, 2016).  
  
 All of the civil servants agreed that the FNFTA fed into top-down ministerial 
accountability with First Nation communities. They also all explained it was a legislative 
measure which they had to implement. One was even reticent, before further probing, about 
discussing the legislation and simply stated: “It was mandated by the previous government to do 
it, so we did it” (INAC 1, Personal Communication, May 18, 2016). In spite of this, three of 
them stressed that they privately received several positive responses to the legislation from First 
Nation leaders and community members whom they worked with. One of them explained that 
over their career with INAC they have gotten to personally know several individuals from the 
communities in their region. Many of them supported the principle of the legislation. They 
stated: “I know a lot of people in the communities and an awful lot of the folks that I count as 
friends and acquaintances and business relationships over the last 30 years, they basically said 
this is a good thing” (INAC 3, Personal Communication, July 13, 2016). Another civil servant 
shared a similar account, “I actually don’t have a major problem with it myself personally. As a 
citizen, as a public servant, or as a band member because I expect that, you know, any 
government that exists should provide this. Now if I were to look at it through the lens of the 
community or community government, well this is somebody else imposing something on us” 
(INAC 4, Personal Communication, July 13, 2016). Despite their personal support for the 
FNFTA, three acknowledged that the legislation’s approach paints an unfair picture that all First 
Nation communities are the same. They explained, “I think that maybe for those communities 
that would do it anyway, is they don’t need it but it’s been applied universally which is sort of 
the unfortunate part because it really doesn’t recognize that those are there” (INAC 4, Personal 
Communication, July 13, 2016). 
 Sovereignty and government control came up in conversation regarding the legislation. 
They believe the negative First Nation reaction exposed a sharp division among community 
perspectives. They explained that there are communities who inherently believe they are part of 
Canada and are subject to its constitution and laws, and those who believe they are distinctly 
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separate sovereign nations. They stated, “To me, that commentary, a lot of it was about those 
communities that are saying, you know, basically ‘I don’t answer to the federal government. I as 
a leader in my community only answer to my band members and your laws don’t apply” (INAC 
3, Personal Communication, July 13, 2016). 
 The question of leadership and accountability also came up in an interview with one 
particular civil servant. They believe that strong leadership more than anything else, including 
INAC’s supports, tools and policies, was how a community was going to make progress in their 
financial management. In their experience with INAC and as a band member, they believe that it 
takes a combination of strong leadership and First Nation members placing demands on their 
leadership for real change. After explaining a success story of a community they worked with, 
they stated: “There was some critical mass of something that happened in the community that 
changed and it wasn’t the funding agreement and it wasn’t how things were funded, it was 
whoever the leadership of the community showing up one day saying ‘we’re going to do things 
differently’” (INAC 4, Personal Communication, July 13, 2016). 
The FNFTA’s consultation process was unanimously agreed upon by the four civil 
servants to be deeply inadequate.  One of them described the process as non-existent and another 
stated there was very little. A third went even further explaining that INAC’s approach to 
consultation is generally inconsistent. Some consultation processes went well while others were 
deeply problematic, and they knew it. They stated: 
First Nations Education Act? Flawed consultation process. First Nations Financial 
Transparency Act in my opinion? Flawed consultation process.  Other acts that the 
previous government passed—the First Nations Election, they got that one right. It wasn’t 
like we didn’t know how; we just didn’t do it right. For whatever reason, and I really 
don’t blame the government for that I think this falls on us—we’re the sponsoring 
department, we didn’t get that right. We just didn’t get that right.  (INAC 3, Personal 
Communication, July 13, 2016).  
 
They later explained that they could understand the problems with the First Nation Education 
Act given the internal dissent within the Assembly of First Nations. However, they were adamant 
that with the First Nations Financial Transparency Act “we really just did seem to kind of say 
‘No. This is what we’re doing’” (INAC 3, Personal Communication, July 13, 2016). 
 A lack of consultation was a significant barrier to the FNFTA’s success. One civil servant 
explained this through past work on Bill C-27 in another INAC region. They described that the 
region’s quality of program reporting was not up to national standards and seriously lagged 
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behind that of other provinces. Knowing that the FNFTA was on the horizon, and a First Nation 
member themselves, they knew First Nation communities were in for a big shock, which would 
only foster greater animosity toward the Crown.  As a result, they worked diligently with 
communities and even visited them in-person explaining what to expect from Ottawa and how to 
prepare for it. They even facilitated and arranged for an in-person meeting with senior officials 
from Ottawa. However, their first step was an unpopular one. They starting enforcing the strict 
reporting requirements by rejecting many of the reports they received from communities. 
Naturally, this made them particularly unpopular with First Nation community leaders in the 
region. They described one distinct meeting with a local First Nation organization that was 
fielding several complaints from communities regarding their rejected reports: 
“So anyways he says ‘We got to meet’. I said ‘OK’. So we met and he didn’t even say hi, 
he says ‘Nobody here’s even met you and they all hate you. I said ‘OK, but a year from 
now FNFTA is going to come in and it’s not going to be just me looking at it, the whole 
world’s going to be able to see this stuff and if we don’t have the same stuff posted on the 
website that they have in Saskatchewan, Alberta, or BC, the whole world’s going to 
know and somebody’s going to ask the question ‘Why is it that you’re implementing 
things differently here than elsewhere?’ (INAC 4, Personal Communication, July 13, 
2016).  
 
By taking the time to prepare the region’s communities, they were one of the first region’s to be 
fully compliant with the FNFTA, and they were more comfortable with the reasons behind its 
development and implementation. In fact, some had even participated in a pilot project where 
they voluntarily agreed to post their finances on their community’s website. By taking the time 
and working with communities to prepare for the FNFTA—de facto consultation, there was far 
less resistance to it in the end.  
The lack of consultation with First Nation communities on the FNFTA reinforces a top-
down traditional style of public administration The INAC officials interviewed for this thesis 
readily admit that the legislation’s consultation process was inadequate. In this light, public 
commentary from First Nation communities and Indigenous organizations asserting that the 
legislation was hastily imposed on them is understandable. Beyond this, however, the long-term 
success and acceptance of future policies that affect First Nation communities and Indigenous 
organizations will undoubtedly require their early participation in the policy development 
process.  
Participatory Governance 
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 The final research element of this thesis was to preliminarily explore the extent of digital 
participation in First Nation community governance. Unfortunately, the perspectives of INAC 
officials were exclusively used since no First Nation communities were successfully interviewed 
for this project. INAC officials were asked about the extent to which digital technologies were 
used in soliciting First Nation community participation in federal policy development and its 
future growth. Three of the four officials were able to confidently speak on the subject.  
 All of the officials who spoke about participatory governance agreed that the extent to 
which it is used in INAC’s policy development is quite minimal. While some program specific 
applications and portals are used, such as the Education Information System, there are very little 
in terms of virtual participation. One official noted, however, that they expect this to change in 
the future. They explained: “In terms of the ways between the community and us, absolutely. I 
think the more sophisticated we get and the more sophisticated First Nations get, you know, 
submitting a report should be a push of a button. It’s the information they want” (INAC 1, 
Personal Communication, May 18, 2016).  
A similar observation was made regarding the use of virtual participatory technologies 
within First Nation communities. One official noted:  
It’s out there but it’s not very prevalent. We hear of communities setting up their own 
website, not everyone, but a lot of them. I don’t know if it’s really gone to the next step 
of participatory governance, or in the inputting of request for budgets and that sort of 
stuff. I don’t think it’s gone that far. I think communities themselves are doing the best 
they can with information sharing (INAC 1, Personal Communication, May 18, 2016).  
 
Despite this, the official did explain that there is a requirement to get information out to off-
reserve members under the Indian Act, which INAC often facilitates for communities; many 
communities have also requested of INAC that they maintain this arrangement. They explained 
this using the example of designating reserve land for economic development and how INAC 
sends out information packages to off-reserve members. They stated that “9 times out of 10 we 
do the mail-outs”. In this respect, they believe there is role for future growth in soliciting the 
perspectives of off-reserve members, which the communities can then lead with fewer 
administrative resources required.  
 A regional official agreed with their national colleague but went even further. They 
explained there are some growing challenges regarding community funding and the increasing 
ratio of urban off-reserve community members relative to on-reserve members. In their 
30 
 
experience as a band member, they have witnessed an increasing community detachment among 
younger generations. As greater numbers of youth move off-reserve to urban areas, they are no 
longer engaged in the community’s affairs. This is also problematic from the perspective of 
protected benefits by way of treaty and the constitution (financial and otherwise). They explained 
that only some of INAC’s funding to communities can be used for off-reserve members. They 
stated, “It kind of depends on which program you’re talking about. So employment programs? 
Yes. Post-secondary? Maybe. Anything else you can’t really use Indian Affairs money to help 
them because it’s tied to the boundaries of that reserve” (INAC 4, Personal Communication, July 
13, 2016).  
The increasing disconnect between off-reserve and on-reserve community members 
raises questions with how First Nation governments remain accountable to off-reserve members. 
After some informal discussion, the same public servant speculated that digital technologies 
might be an option to increase urban off-reserve member participation in community 
governance, but further follow-up would be needed to flesh out this idea. Coincidentally, at the 
time of the interview, a protest was occurring outside of the regional office that consisted of off-
reserve urban community members who believed that First Nation community leaders were 
unaccountable and overlooked the needs of urban off-reserve members. The public servant 
noted: 
So what I think is that you’d end up finding more people in urban areas that are…out 
here if you were to sit and talk to these people [points to the protestors outside], are very, 
very disaffected by First Nations and how they’re funded and how they operate. This 
group out front believes that it’s a creation of the Indian Act therefore they’re not really 
legitimate governments—they’re superimposed governments that serve to suit the needs 
of themselves as opposed to the needs of treaty Indian people in Saskatchewan. So the 
amount of distrust and the amount of accountability angst is greater amongst urban 
Aboriginal people than it is amongst people on reserve. Although that may or may not be 
true in all cases (INAC 4, Personal Communication, July 13, 2016). 
 
 One civil servant explained that communities want to provide benefits to their urban 
members but it is a double-edged sword. On one hand, they are bound by their funding 
agreement and the Indian Act in terms of who is eligible for funding. On the other, they want the 
money to stay within the community; why send money to those living off-reserve when there are 
those in need on-reserve who plan on staying in the community? In any given scenario, First 
Nation community challenges associated with a growing urban Indigenous population will only 
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be exacerbated in the coming years. Each community knows their needs best and managing this 
growing challenge will require meaningful engagement and consultation of their perspectives.  
Analysis 
 Many trends can be observed from the evidence provided by the four INAC public 
servants interviewed. However, this project advances three in particular with how the 
government’s approach to Indigenous accountability policies has changed over the last 10 years. 
1. INAC’s reporting burden on First Nation communities has only marginally decreased; 2. 
Current administrative frameworks maintain and even strengthen Crown control over First 
Nation communities. 3. Extensive and meaningful consultation is an imperative interim measure 
on the path increased Indigenous self-determination.  
 The overall administrative burden on First Nation communities has not been significantly 
reduced. All of the INAC officials interviewed agreed that there were some initial savings, 
however three of the four were adamant that communities still had to submit the same level of 
information. One senior official from the department’s head office affirmed this point. They 
explained that the reporting requirements and performance measures under the grants and 
contributions approach is inconsistent with the type of relationship Canada and First Nations 
need to get to if there is to be a true nation-nation relationship. He stated: “The reality of it with 
First Nations being another level of government, in the context of federal-provincial relations 
where we do statutory payments and fiscal transfers, we’re still stuck in grants and 
contributions… and very few in terms of grants” (INAC 1, Personal Communication, May 18, 
2016).  
 By design, New Public Management’s focus on the private sector ideal of value for 
money means that promoting increased self-determination in First Nation communities takes a 
back seat to the Crown’s fiscal priorities. As found by the Auditor General in 2011, program 
evaluation has shifted away from assessing program effectiveness to an increasingly financial 
audit based approach. Harry Swain and Ian Clark touched on this point in their book, A Subtle 
Balance: Expertise, Evidence, and Democracy in Public Policy and Governance, 1970-2010 
(Clark and Swain 2015). Using Jean Chretien’s emergency program review as an example, they 
found that audit focused evaluation can have detrimental impacts on government programs, 
particularly in the long-run. For instance, they determined an audit based approach under 
Chretien’s program led to a 2% annual increase funding cap on First Nation education that 
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remains in place today. This cap, they argue, constrains the delivery of quality education on First 
Nation reserves.  
Clark and Swain believe that standardized evaluation measures do not reflect the different 
human realities of each department or the political context under which government operates. 
The latter point is particularly relevant to Justin Trudeau’s present Liberal government. Trudeau 
made significant promises to Canada’s Indigenous peoples during the 2015 election campaign, 
which he reaffirmed when he assumed office. His biggest promise was to realign Canada’s 
relationship with Indigenous peoples to a nation to nation level. Unfortunately, the public 
service’s current performance based administrative framework is simply incapable of meeting 
this mandate. Ministerial accountability is a fundamental pillar of our current democratic system 
where the accountability relationship with First Nation communities is managed vertically from 
the Minster down through INAC to the community level. Furthermore, program reporting 
measures remain burdensome despite the Reducing the Administrative Burden Initiative.  
The impact of meaningful consultation and engagement can be powerful, as evidenced by 
INAC officials with their successful consultation on certain pieces of legislation. Meaningful 
consultation gives power to Indigenous voices and is a tangible step forward in enabling 
Indigenous self-determination.  
CHAPTER 5 - INDIGENOUS REACTIONS 
The federal government’s Indigenous accountability policies have changed since 2006. 
Of the changes, Bill C-27 received the most attention from First Nations communities and 
organizations. However, reactions were not solely directed at the legislation. Instead, the FNFTA 
should be viewed as a flashpoint for longstanding Indigenous tensions with the Crown. 
Deconstructing public commentary for and against the legislation reveals the discussion was less 
about how to strengthen accountability and more about who has the authority to implement and 
govern (H. King 2014; Wilson-Raybould 2013; MacKay 2016; Jones 2015; Alcantara 2012). 
Indigenous perspectives and reactions to the FNFTA range considerably. There are those 
who fully support the legislation, those who support it in-principle but desire amendments, and 
those that oppose it outright. A variety of Indigenous perspectives were on the public record 
regarding the FNFTA. Multiple witnesses were called to speak during government review of Bill 
C-27 at two committees: the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development and the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples. Three 
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Indigenous perspectives from these committees were reviewed: Chief Darcy Bear of Dakota 
Whitecap First Nation as community leader, Jody Wilson-Raybould as a representative of an 
Indigenous organization, and Beverly Brown as a member of Squamish First Nation in British 
Columbia.  
Chief Darcy Bear, Whitecap Dakota First Nation, Saskatchewan  
Chief Bear appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development on October 17, 2012. His opening statement to the committee 
was a story of the community’s evolution from near bankruptcy in the early 1990’s to financial 
prosperity (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012). He 
described several factors that contributed to the community’s financial turnaround: a 
commitment to community accountability and transparency, capacity building, self-
determination, and leadership. His community’s story is one of resilience and success that has 
earned them the reputation among government officials as being a model First Nation 
community.  
Financial accountability and transparency to community members was a fundamental 
pillar of Whitecap’s financial rebound according to the Chief’s testimony. He stated:  
It’s important for any organization. It’s not just First Nations communities. Whether 
you’re a municipal, provincial, or federal government, or a non-profit or for-profit 
organization, accountability and transparency are very important, and having a strong 
financial track record is important (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development 2012, 14).  
 
Chief Bear’s insistence on financial accountability and transparency is understandable. His 
community’s economic growth and financial state rapidly improved as a result of his leadership, 
commitment to accountability, and financial reforms. In fact, according to Chief Bear’s address 
to the committee, the community’s employment rate dropped from 70% to 4.1% during his time 
in office. The community operates a golf-course and casino and plans to open a hotel, which was 
originally slated to open in 2014.  
It should be noted that in 2013 the band’s financial manager was caught embezzling over 
$2 million in band funds which delayed the hotel’s construction. Auditing firms that worked with 
the First Nation claim that some internal financial controls were not followed that contributed to 
the prolonged fraud. However, do these claims mean Whitecap Dakota First Nation is 
unaccountable? Not necessarily. Accountability is about being answerable and responsible for 
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one’s actions, not about preventing criminal behavior. Even the strongest accountability 
measures do not stop crime, and non-indigenous governments are not immune to this. Consider 
the sponsorship scandal that rocked the Liberal Party which enabled the rise of Stephen Harper’s 
Conservatives in 2006. Consider how the former Mayor of Laval, Gilles Vaillancourt, was 
recently found guilty of defrauding Laval, a suburb of Montreal, of over $8 million (Perreaux 
2016). Consider how members of the Conservative Party of Canada were charged (later dropped 
in exchange for a fine) for circumventing election finance rules during the 2006 general 
election8. Of course, there are more examples of unaccountable and nontransparent behavior on 
the part of Canadian and First Nation officials. However, the point being that accountability 
entails increased vigilance and does not entail stopping criminal behavior from occurring. In 
Whitecap Dakota First Nation’s case, the financial manager was immediately terminated, 
criminally charged, and subject to legal action by the First Nation to recover the stolen funds. 
Chief Darcy Bear was transparent with his community about the fraud and took action to 
improve the community’s accountability measures by developing and implementing a new anti-
fraud policy (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012; 
Whitecap Dakota First Nation 2016; CBC News 2014; Whitecap Dakota First Nation 2014). 
 Despite some initial reservations and changes to Bill C-27, Chief Bear supports the 
FNFTA. During the committee meeting he openly expressed his support for Bill C-27 in 
principle, stating: “We certainly do support the bill. Originally, when it was rolled out by Kelly 
[Kelly Block, MP for the former riding of Saskatoon-Rosetown-Biggar now Carleton Trail-Eagle 
Creek], it was Bill C-575. We have no issues as far as being accountable to our members. We do 
share our audit with our members annually.” (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development 2012, 10). At the time of speaking, however, Chief Bear shared some of 
his reservations concerning the level of detail required in the consolidated financial statements. 
He believed Bill C-27’s approach to consolidating financial data held First Nation leaders to a 
different set of accounting standards compared to other government entities. He stated: 
If you’re staying in a hotel, or if you’re flying, or you have other transportation costs, 
they shouldn’t be considered as part of your salary. Certainly, it’s not for any of you. You 
 
                                                 
8 This was more commonly known as the ‘in-and-out’ scheme which involved shifting funds from the national 
campaign, which had reached its spending limit, to ridings that hadn’t reached their limits. Riding offices were then 
instructed to return the funds to the national campaign after claiming it as a campaign advertising expense that 
qualified for a partial refund by elections Canada.  
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don’t have to experience that, so why would you impose that on First Nation leaders? 
That certainly has to be corrected (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development 2012, 11).  
 
  Dakota Whitecap First Nation’s primary accountability relationship is with its 
community members. Chief Bear informed the  Standing Committee of this in response to a 
question by MP Carol Hughes. Hughes asked about the FNFTA’s contentious requirement that 
consolidated financial audits be publicly posted on INAC’s website9. Chief Bear stated: 
As for how each community gets that information to their members, it should be up to 
them. If it is going to be via the net, then there should be a pass code that they have to 
use, because it’s information that is privileged to them as a Whitecap member. That 
would be my answer, anyway, with regard to the internet. It shouldn’t be available to 
everyone. I don’t think it’s everybody’s business what we’re doing (Standing Committee 
on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 16).  
 
Chief Bear later explained that he is not opposed to sharing financial information with the 
government and external stakeholders that provide resources to the community. Rather, he must 
respect his primary accountability relationship with community members by giving them 
information first. He stated, “We can share that audit with the government, not a problem, but it 
should be shared with the Whitecap members; another First Nation, I don’t think it’s any of their 
business” (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 16). 
However, despite this position, he conceded that he did not have a major issue with this new 
requirement. Under further questioning he stated: “I don’t see the big issue here. I think if we’re 
open and transparent, why would we oppose something that’s just saying that it’s transparency 
and providing that to our members? Providing the changes we put forward are made, I don’t see 
the issue. It’s just about being transparent to our people” (Standing Committee on Aboriginal 
Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 16).  
Developing internal expert capacity was another element that contributed to Dakota 
Whitecap’s financial turnaround. Chief Bear explained to the committee that he often sees 
communities struggling to make decisions and the need for more internal expert capacity. He 
stated: 
It’s no different from your table, where you need to have good financial information to 
make good decisions as leaders. That’s the same thing that first nations people should 
 
                                                 
9 This requirement was new and was not previously required in the government’s funding agreements with First 
Nation communities, which the FNTA’s content and language largely mirrored.  
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have as well—the professional capacity to make those good decision for the people 
(Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 13). 
 
Chief Bear used his community as an example. Shortly after being elected Chief in 1991, the 
community hired a professional accountant to help straighten the community’s finances and 
incrementally develop internal capacity. He recounted the story to the committee:  
A lot of communities are funded [federal government funding] and we have financial 
clerks. But a financial clerk cannot keep pace with the onerous reporting requirements of 
the federal government. So I convinced the federal government to do something different: 
let’s hire a professional accountant for Whitecap; in year one you pay 100%; in year two, 
you pay 75% we pay 25%; in year three, we go 50-50, in year four, we’ll pay 75% you 
pay 25%; and in year five we’re going to take over the position. They approved that and 
the rest is history (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
2012, 13). 
 
Chief Bear recognized the need for external financial help early and his negotiation with the 
federal government allowed the community to retain authority to choose their own external 
financial expertise. In doing so, the community narrowly avoided third-party management.10 
Chief Bear explained:  
Third-party managers don’t want to work themselves out of a job. They don’t want to see 
the First Nations build any capacity. Therefore, the model that we created back then 
worked for us (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
2012, 10).  
 
Elements of self- determination are discernible in Chief Bear’s story about his negotiation. In 
retaining the authority to hire an external accountant, he prioritized the community’s internal 
accountability relationship over its relationship with the government, and others.  
 
 Strong community leadership also contributed to Dakota Whitecap’s financial 
turnaround. When Chief Bear was first elected as Chief in the early 90’s, he was 23 years old. 
Facing the daunting prospect of bankruptcy and third-party management, he knew things had to 
be done differently. He explains:  
That very first day I was elected there were two choices. The first choice: ‘Who needs 
this? I may as well walk away and forget about it.’ But as leaders, as you all know, as you 
 
                                                 
10 Third Party Management is a last resort used by INAC in communities with high default risk. The department 
appoints a third party financial manager to manage a First Nation community’s finances for a defined period of time 
or until the root causes of financial mismanagement are addressed. It is viewed by many First Nation communities 
as an overly aggressive, intrusive and hard handed approach.  
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are elected, when there are challenges, we have to accept those challenges, find solutions 
and go forward (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
2012, 9).  
 
Chief Bear believes a community is bound to suffer without strong leadership and a 
determination to improve a community’s financial well-being. He stated: 
We’ve seen time and again that because of a leadership change, the community has 
actually crashed. You can have a First Nation with good leadership, moving things 
forward, and all it takes—it’s easy to spend money, anybody can spend money—and 
bang, it goes down. Then what happens? (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development 2012, 12) 
 
 Despite his initial reservations with Bill C-27, Chief Bear strongly favors it. He describes 
how the Bill’s forced transparency mechanisms are important in cases where leadership changes 
lead to less financial transparency and accountability in First Nation communities. He stated: 
We don’t have any kind of mechanism in our community legislation currently, and if a 
new leadership came in and decided they didn’t want to share that financial information, 
there is no obligation for them to do so. I think’s it’s important going forward that all 
Whitecap members know what’s happening in our community from a financial 
perspective: where we are, if we are financially healthy, and what kind of shape we are 
in. I think it’s important that there is a mechanism to catch that for our members. As 
leaders, we have to share that. Unfortunately, as I said, when I was first elected, there was 
no such bill in place (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development 2012, 13).  
 
It is important to point out two things concerning Chief Bear’s support for Bill C-27. 
First, his support for the bill does not preclude his desire for increased community capacity, 
which is discernible in his story concerning his negotiation with the federal government on hiring 
an external accountant. Second, his perspectives were cited by the government as consultation 
with Indigenous communities despite objections that little consultation occurred. This is 
significant as it seems that Chief Bear’s feedback was afforded greater weight in Bill C-27’s 
development compared to other Indigenous leaders. This is evidenced during Hon. John 
Duncan’s testimony to the Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples during 
deliberation of Bill C-27. Mr. Duncan was the Minister of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada at the time. He described how Chief Bear’s feedback was considered in the 
bill’s development. However, he does not reference how opposing perspectives were considered, 
if at all. This suggests, to some extent, that opposing perspectives may not have been considered 
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in the Bill’s creation. However further research would need to explore and confirm this 
speculation. This potential exclusion of opposing perspectives is evident in the Minister’s 
response to questions from Senator Nick Sibbeston concerning consultation for the bill. The 
following is an excerpt of their exchange: 
 
Senator Sibbeston: My line of questions will deal with consultation…I understand you 
said that the consultation went even before Bill C-575 [precursor to Bill C-27], but I 
gather there has been no consultation on this bill. Am I correct on this matter, minister, 
that there really has been very little consultation on Bill C-27? 
 
Mr. Duncan: I would not put it that way. When we introduced the bill in November of 
2011, I did write to all chiefs and councils enclosing a copy of the bill. In my covering 
letter I invited First Nations leadership to learn more about the bill and to contact the 
Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development if they wished to 
participate in the parliamentary process with the bill.  We certainly did receive feedback. 
Yes, Chief Bear was in committee, and yes, Chief Bear gave us comprehensive thoughts. 
There were other chiefs who knew he was doing that and did not participate because he 
was their proxy. That is just an efficient way to do things. I would say there was a fair 
degree of consultation and there was a lot of public discussion at that time as well 
(Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 2013, 16).  
 
Despite the Minister’s assertion that there was a fair degree of consultation on the bill, he had 
stated earlier in the committee meeting that no direct consultation occurred with First Nation 
community members. He admitted this in response to a pointed question from Senator Lillian 
Dyck of Saskatchewan. The following is an excerpt of their exchange: 
 
Senator Dyck: I believe that Senator Lovelace Nicholas was asking if any band members 
had input to the bill. You had Chief Darcy Bear, but did band members actually have 
input into the design of the bill? 
 
Mr. Duncan: No. We did not have band members’ input into the design of the bill, but 
some band members have applauded the bill (Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal 
Peoples 2013, 14).  
 
The point of highlighting these exchanges with the Minister is that Chief Bear’s perspectives 
were considered and responded to in Bill C-27’s development. It raises questions as to what 
effect consultation with other communities, including those who opposed the bill, might have 
had on its overall reception among Indigenous organizations and First Nation communities. As 
some INAC officials noted during interviews for this project, proposed government legislation 
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that was subject to a comprehensive consultation process with First Nation communities and 
Indigenous organizations was often well received in the end.  
Jody Wilson-Raybould, Assembly of First Nations Regional Chief, British Columbia 
Jody Wilson- Raybould was another witness to speak on Bill C-27. She appeared before 
the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
on October 17, 2012 and the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples on March 5, 
2013. In both instances, she represented the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) as their lead on 
First Nations governance. At the time, she was also an AFN Regional Chief for British 
Columbia. A lawyer by training, Wilson-Raybould is now Canada’s first Indigenous Federal 
Minister of Justice in Prime Minister Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government. In both addresses, 
Wilson-Raybould shared AFN’s perspective on the previous Conservative government’s 
approach to First Nation accountability and transparency. Her committee statements had three 
discernible themes: commitment to community accountability and transparency, self-
determination, Crown paternalism, capacity building, partnership, and consultation.    
Canada’s Indigenous peoples expect accountability and transparency from their political 
leaders no differently than non-Indigenous Canadians do of theirs. Wilson-Raybould believes 
Bill-C27 presented an unfair picture that all First Nation communities are poor fiscal managers in 
need of government intervention (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development 2012, 1). In reality, as Wilson-Raybould explained, the vast majority of First 
Nation communities demonstrate and are committed to strong accountability and transparency to 
their members (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 1). 
She stated: 
Most of the accountability measures in the bill are similar to those found in any First 
Nations constitution or its laws. In fact, First Nations are already required to report on 
matters covered in the bill, through contribution agreements with the federal government. 
Whether an Indian Act band or not, our nations follow the handbook respecting public 
sector accounting, as prepared by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 2).  
 
 In December 2010, the AFN passed a resolution on First Nations Accountability and 
Transparency in response to Bill C-27’s predecessor—private member Bill C-575. The 
resolution affirmed First Nation communities’ ability and authority to design their own 
accountability and transparency mechanisms (See Addendum 2) (Assembly of First Nations 
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2010; Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012). It also 
affirmed that First Nation community leaders are accountable to their members first and the 
Crown second (Assembly of First Nations 2010). However, the government continued with Bill 
C-27 in spite of the resolution and the demonstrated good governance of many First Nations 
communities across Canada. According to Wilson-Rayboud, this fostered resentment among 
many of AFN’s Chiefs. She stated:  
It is not surprising that many of our chiefs have resented this approach and are turning the 
lens back on Canada, suggesting that it is Canada that needs to develop more stringent 
accountability frameworks for their governing bodies, that it is Canada that needs to be 
held more accountable for the treatment of First Nations (Standing Committee on 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 1).  
 
Wilson-Raybould criticized Bill C-27 for disregarding Indigenous self-determination and 
for its overall paternalistic approach to accountability. This is particularly evident when she 
speaks about the Bill’s requirement that First Nation communities post their consolidated 
financial audits online for public access. Those in favour of the act believe this requirement 
affords an immediate and direct line of financial transparency between community leaders and 
their members. However, Wilson-Raybould argued this approach was short-sighted and actually 
inhibited First Nation community accountability and transparency in the long run. As long as the 
government dictates the process, there is no incentive or ownership—and ultimately 
legitimacy— over improving accountability and transparency in communities. She stated that 
anything “imposed upon our First Nations that is not legitimized by our citizens is ultimately 
destined to fail” (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 
4).  
Wilson-Raybould used her community’s Financial Administration Law as an example of 
how communities can develop their own robust accountability mechanisms. The law was 
developed under the authority of the federal government’s First Nations Fiscal Management Act. 
She explained that their “law is directed and ratified by our nations, it is far more comprehensive 
than Bill C-27, and, more to the point, it is legitimate in the eyes of our people” (Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 2). She goes even further, 
arguing that Bill C-27 oversimplifies and conflates accountability with transparency. The bill, 
she argued, did little to tangibly improve accountability procedures in spite of increased financial 
transparency between leaders and their members. She noted, “It seeks to disclose financial 
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statements in terms of what a First nation is doing on that end. In terms of supporting First 
Nations and building capacity and building institutions of good government, this bill does not 
address that, in my opinion” (Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development 2012, 7).   
Providing resources that enable expert capacity development in communities is a 
practical step to improving accountability and transparency while respecting self-determination, 
explained Wilson-Raybould. Communities need support from the government to re-build the 
knowledge and capacity that was lost under 150 years of colonial rule (Senate of Canada, 2013 
p.10). She argued that it was unfair to expect so much of communities that had only had a few 
years to replace what the Crown has had 150 years to establish. As a result, Wilson-Raybould 
believes partnership and collaboration with First Nation communities is a more effective 
approach to improving accountability and transparency over top-down approaches. In response 
to a question from Conservative MP Kelly Block, the member responsible for Bill C-575 (Bill C-
27’s predecessor), Wilson-Raybould stated: 
I think about the question another way: how can the Minister of Indian Affairs and the 
parliamentarians around this table support our evolving governments—not tell us how 
our government should change, or what rules or laws we should put in place, but how we 
can support the conversation within our communities, support our citizens in seeking and 
accessing the information that we require, and empower our citizens to direct the change 
that is sought within their communities, based upon our priorities? (Standing Committee 
on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 7). 
 
The Conservative government’s approach was the opposite, according to Raybould. In fact, 
access to external governance resources was constrained during the previous government’s 
tenure. They reduced funding to several Indigenous organizations that focused on good 
governance. She explained: 
One of those institutions was the National Centre for First Nations Governance, which 
was significantly cut back and is having to consider closing its doors, while the intention 
behind the governance centre was to create that support—or create the centre of 
excellence, if you want to call it that—that would support first nations government’s 
during this transition period. So there’s another challenge (Standing Committee on 
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 17).  
 
In addition to the cutbacks, Wilson Raybould decried the lack of consultation with First Nation 
communities and the AFN on Bill C-27. Nevertheless, her testimony remained positively focused 
on developing future opportunities for collaborative policy development with First Nation 
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communities as opposed to lambasting the government. In response to a question from the 
Standing Senate Committee regarding the lack of consultation on Bill C-27, she stated: 
There is a huge opportunity, as I also said, for us to look at joint policy development or 
look at having some consideration from the outset with respect to these issues. If that 
were the case, there would have been regard for what First Nations are actually doing to 
create, develop and implement concrete, comprehensive financial accountability 
mechanisms and systems within their communities…(Senate of Canada 2013, 19).  
 
Canada’s diverse Indigenous population ensures that there are diverse perspectives on 
federal accountability frameworks. Each community brings different experiences, different 
values, and different circumstances. In reference to a governance toolkit she helped develop for 
B.C First Nation communities, Wilson Raybould illustrates the benefit of multiple perspectives. 
She stated:  
What it does and why it has been so successful is it tells the story of what our nations are 
doing. It tells it from their perspective […] In terms of financial administration, there are 
limited provisions available to create bylaws under the Indian Act. It provides the options 
for first nations to choose to celebrate the successes of others and adopt them into their 
own communities, or to create alternatives or options for other people (Standing 
Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 2012, 9).  
 
Wilson Raybould’s testimony illustrates New Public Management’s inadequacy in 
fostering authentic nation to nation relationship. First Nation communities need the authority to 
design and implement their own accountability mechanisms based on their particular 
circumstances. Unfortunately, standardized performance-based measures within INAC and the 
Treasury Board do not allow for much deviation. While her community created their own 
financial management law under the First Nations Fiscal Management Act, there are strict 
requirements and pre-conditions before a community can qualify for this process. As a result, 
some communities cannot access the tools that enable their increased self-determination because 
they are constrained in meeting complex standardized measures that are inherently illegitimate in 
their community’s eyes.  
Beverly Brown, Squamish First Nation, British Columbia 
 Beverly Brown appeared as a witness before the Senate Standing Committee on 
Aboriginal Peoples to discuss her perspectives, as a community member, on Bill C-27. Three 
discernible themes were pulled from her testimony: mistrust towards community leadership and 
government, consultation, and commitment to community accountability and transparency.  
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Brown believes there was a longstanding lack of accountability and transparency within 
Squamish First Nation’s leadership. Her deep mistrust is evident throughout her testimony, 
particularly when she discusses the community’s financial state and the management of band 
owned businesses. Despite repeated attempts, she alleged the community’s leadership denied her 
requests for the community’s financial information. She stated:  
We deserve to know what our chief and council pay themselves, their travel, 
honorariums, et cetera, because it comes out of our own-source revenues. We, the people 
of the Squamish Nation, have never been told directly the true revenue figures […] The 
Squamish Nation leadership, chief and council, our elected officials, brag to the media 
about our own-source revenue flow and the public knew our own revenues before we did. 
We only know what they disclose publicly (Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal 
Peoples 2013, 85).  
 
Brown is also mistrustful towards the Crown. She believes the federal government’s economic 
development initiatives are under-handed mechanisms to access First Nation community lands 
and resources. As she says, “The government and the Crown, in plain view, are using the federal 
board known as chief and council to convert our lands, resources, assets and people, and this is 
wrong. It goes against the duty of the Crown vis-a-vis our relationship” (Standing Senate 
Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 2013, 85). 
 Government consultation and engagement must include community member 
perspectives, argued Brown. She criticized both the Squamish First Nation leadership and the 
federal government for failing to consult community members on Bill C-27. She alleged in her 
testimony that “All of this has been done privately between the government and Chief and 
Council, without the people. This type of trickery has to stop. This needs to be regulated and 
proper consent, authority and approval obtained from the people—all people in each nation, not 
just the Squamish Nation (Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 2013, 83). In spite 
of this, however, she still supported the proposed legislation in principle. She explained that 
“anything that makes this information public is a step in the right direction” (Standing Senate 
Committee on Aboriginal Peoples 2013, 93).  
Self-determination is a prevalent theme in Brown’s testimony. She believed communities 
should retain some control over their accountability and transparency mechanisms despite the 
government’s top-down approach in Bill C-27. In response to a question regarding the scope and 
depth of financial audits required under Bill, she stated: “I would feel better if it covered own 
source revenues, but within reason. I do not think they want the government regulating 
44 
 
everything. I think they want to have something to themselves” (Standing Senate Committee on 
Aboriginal Peoples 2013, 94). Brown is also unsure how long the regulations should be in place. 
She noted, “I do not know that I want it to be long term, and perhaps there is another way to look 
at it, but I feel like Bill C-27 is a step in the right direction” (Standing Senate Committee on 
Aboriginal Peoples 2013, 95). 
 
Analysis of Indigenous Reactions 
A community’s position on Bill C-27 does not necessarily reflect their stance on 
improving accountability. This is demonstrated by a commitment to accountability and 
transparency shared among the three testimonies, despite their different outlook on the 
legislation.  All three witnesses also touched on the importance of community autonomy in 
designing accountability mechanisms that suit their needs. Chief Bear spoke of his negotiation 
with the federal government in retaining the power to hire their own external financial expertise 
to avoid third-party management.  Chief Wilson-Raybould spoke of her community’s successful 
experience in developing their own constitutional and financial administration law. Beverly 
Brown recognized the potential for alternative approaches and the need for greater flexibility in 
the legislation, despite her support for increased government regulation.  
 The concepts of legitimacy and accountability in First Nation community governance are 
not new and have been well studied. The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic 
Development is an ongoing research project that investigates “the conditions under which 
sustained, self-determined social and economic development is achieved” in America’s First 
Nation communities (The Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development 2015). 
Stephen Cornell and Joseph Kalt founded the project in 1987. While an American-based 
initiative, the Harvard Project has been instrumental in advancing Canadian research in First 
Nation self-governance. Cornell wrote a research paper that looked at the foundations and 
necessary pre-conditions of self-governance in Canada. He argued that maximizing 
accountability between First Nation leaders and their communities alone is a relatively 
straightforward policy achievement. However, he contends that if the objective is to maximize 
First Nation self-governance, the task is far more complex. He explains: 
Research on U.S. cases strongly suggests that accountability alone is not enough to insure 
either that institutions have community support or that they effectively serve community 
interests. To accomplish these goals, governing institutions must not only be accountable 
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to their communities. They must also have the legitimacy in the eyes of those 
communities, and accountability and legitimacy are not the same thing (Cornell 1993, 2).  
 
As a result, institutions with robust accountability procedures will fail if they are “unable to 
maintain the allegiance of the people or to mobilize the community effectively in support of 
government policy, development strategy, or collective action” (Cornell 1993, 8). Consequently, 
many of Canada’s First Nation communities suffer from ineffective governance as there is no 
community legitimacy behind their institutions. Without legitimacy, communities will be 
“continually second-guessing and overturning governmental actions” which inhibits the 
development of “coherent long-term” policies (Cornell 1993, 9). He stated: 
Accountability without legitimacy means the community will be continually second-
guessing and overturning governmental actions, and government itself ultimately will be 
unable to pursue effective, coherent long-term set of policies, not because it is 
unaccountable, but because as a set of institutions, it lacks the support of its own people 
(Cornell 1993, 9).  
 
Cornell further argues that to institute successful accountability between First Nation 
governments and their members “both the relationships of accountability and the procedures 
through which accountability is maintained themselves must each have legitimacy within the 
tribal community” (Cornell 1993, 9).  
Canada’s diverse Indigenous population is at odds with New Public Management’s focus 
on standardization and centralization. As Cornell noted, institutions “must have legitimacy in the 
eyes of those communities, and accountability and legitimacy are not the same thing”. Wilson-
Raybould’s testimony highlighted this disconnect. She also pointed out that Bill C-27 does 
nothing to institute accountability procedures in communities. She explained it only provides 
transparency for aggregated financial data, which she does not describe as being an inherently 
bad thing. However, she asked the committee to consider what a community member is to do 
with this information if there are no formal and legitimate mechanisms to hold leaders to 
account.  
Consultation and engagement with First Nations is a critical step towards increased self-
determination. Communities know their localized needs best. Simply put, there is less legitimacy 
if their insight is excluded from policy development. As long as the federal government dictates 
the process, First Nation communities will remain subservient to the Crown through a complex 
web of policies introduced under the rubric of New Public Management. In this light, the strong 
46 
 
negative reaction to Bill C-27 is understandable as the bill’s top-down approach reinforced 
paternalistic relations with First Nation communities.  
CHAPTER 6 - CONCLUSION  
How have Canada’s Indigenous accountability policies changed from 2006 to 2016? In 
many respects, they have changed a great deal, and in other ways they have not. As discussed up 
until this point, some of the changes were inherently positive, such as the availability of more 
tailored funding models using the revised funding authorities based  on a community’s risk 
score. However, reporting requirements remain burdensome despite some savings from the 
administrative consolidation in the early stages of the reduction initiative. Moreover, 
community’s will remain subservient to the Crown’s program objectives as long as they are 
subject to external performance audits, which are not necessarily disputed. Performance audits 
are simply a financial risk management tool under New Public Management. Unfortunately, 
Indigenous perspectives are often excluded in shaping performance requirements (some of which 
remain redundant) which only reinforces the paternalistic narrative that shrouds the Crown’s 
relationship with Canada’s First Nation communities. More importantly, however, accountability 
relationships under New Public Management do not align with how most communities envision 
a nation to nation relationship. The two concepts are simply incompatible. Public promises of a 
nation to nation relationship with First Nation communities are nothing more than hollow 
rhetoric as long as there is a donor-recipient funding relationship linked to strict performance 
requirements.  
New Public Management will likely remain the dominant administrative model for some 
time. This is why meaningful consultation and engagement with Indigenous peoples is an 
important interim measure on the path to future administrative reform. However, bridging the 
gap between the Trudeau government’s political desires and the administrative limitations of 
New Public Management will require significant effort on the part of politicians and civil 
servants. Former Parliamentary Budget Officer (PBO) Kevin Page touched on this point in his 
recent book, Unaccountable: Truth and Lies on Parliament Hill.  
His book documents his time as Canada’s first PBO during the Conservative 
administration under Stephen Harper. He believes that years of acquiescence and indifference by 
the public, politicians, and civil servants has paralyzed our democratic institutions from 
effectively serving the interests of Canadians. He noted: “Sadly, I sense that many Canadians, 
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civil servants included, have settled into a place of indifference. We are disconnected from our 
parliament. We have lost trust in political leaders and public servants. Our collective response, 
increasingly, is to turn our heads, look the other way, shrug our shoulders, and hope that 
somehow all will be well” (Page 2015, 7). Page stresses the need for public service reform to 
move passed the level of widespread indifference he observes. He noted: “The public service in 
Canada needs an overhaul. Normal isn’t good enough. Canadians cannot accept the old ‘just 
following orders’ justification that has permeated many levels of the public service within our 
country” (Page 2015, 175).  
Public service indifference may have played a role in the FNFTA’s flawed consultation 
process. One civil servant placed the FNFTA’s poor consultation record squarely on the 
shoulders of public servants, not the government. In response to probing about whether political 
pressure led to a rushed consultation process, they responded:  
I honestly don’t know. It was self-evident that when you pass laws in Canada, you have 
to talk to First Nations. That if it impacts them, you have to talk to First Nations. That’s 
not new, right? I don’t know if we provided advice that wasn’t taken, I guess that’s one 
thing that could have happened but it just seemed to me that we all knew it was coming, 
we all knew there was going to be pressure to create some kind of law, it would seem to 
me that we should have gone out and consulted on what the law would be, right? And we 
were involved in it because so much of that law was basically our funding agreements.  
 
The point being that Indigenous perspectives must be directly and extensively involved in the 
development of policies that affect them. However, achieving a nation to nation relationship as 
envisioned by some Indigenous leaders is a formidable task, and it is an end goal that New 
Public Management as represented in the Canadian federal administration is structurally ill-
suited for. This does not suggest that NPM prevents Canada from one day realizing a nation to 
nation relationship. It suggests that the current mix of New Public Management with elements of 
traditional top-down public administration is incompatible with a nation to nation relationship.  
The pathway to reconciliation is a dynamic one. Expectations do not always align and 
challenges will inevitably arise. In this light, a nuanced and phased approach with First Nation 
communities and Indigenous organizations could be a reasonable path to reconciliation. Co-
policy development with First Nation communities and Indigenous organizations is one 
suggested approach and has been gaining traction within policy circles. Moreover, co-policy 
development with Indigenous bodies would complement the current menu of opt-in legislation 
available to First Nation communities such as the First Nations Fiscal Management Act (FNMA) 
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and the First Nations Election Act (FNEA) that enable increased community control over certain 
elements of their governance (Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada 2015a; Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada 2016a). For example, under the FNMA, First Nation communities can 
opt-in to the legislation to create their own Financial Administration Law (FAL).11   
Academics such as Ken Coates and Blaine Favel believe co-policy development is the 
logical next step in consultation and engagement with First Nation communities, particularly in 
the natural resource sector. They set out their vision for co-policy development in response to 
Canada’s recent adoption of the United Nations Declaration on Indigenous Peoples. Their made-
in-Canada approach has five different key elements. First, the Government of Canada and all 
major Indigenous organizations should develop “a common declaration or public statement that 
articulates support for the spirit and intent underpinning the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples as it relates to resource development” (Coates and Favel 2016, 23). The 
statement should reflect a united commitment to national prosperity sharing with Indigenous 
peoples. Secondly, The Government of Canada, the provinces, and territories must work with 
“Indigenous organizations and peoples” to define “how the ‘national interest’ intersects with the 
interests of a specific Indigenous community or group with regard to resource development” 
(Coates and Favel 2016, 23). Third, the Government of Canada, provinces, and territories, and 
Indigenous Organizations, must “negotiate a national framework (or regional ones) to “capture 
provincial and territorial circumstances” on Indigenous participation in resource development 
(Coates and Favel 2016, 24). Fourth, Canada must develop a “decision making and conflict 
resolution system that is culturally sensitive, timely and fair” (Coates and Favel 2016, 24). Fifth, 
Indigenous communities could develop a declaration that defines what Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent means to them. They could also develop an accompanying framework and Indigenous 
licenses that “sets out Indigenous requirements and expectations for participation in resource 
development”. They believe the Indigenous developed framework should: 
1. Reflect regional and local priorities.  
2. Establish minimum standards for consultation and accommodation.  
3. Have consultation and approval processes that reflect community requirements and 
needs.  
 
                                                 
11 An FAL, in essence is a set of community developed financial rules and best practices that “govern the decision 
making, management, monitoring and reporting” of the First Nation’s financial administration (First Nation 
Financial Management Board 2014).  
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4. Set boundaries around resource development near sacred and culturally significant 
sites.  
5. List expectations “in terms of employment, training, education, and resource sharing.  
6. List “requirements concerning environmental evaluation, monitoring and 
mediation”(Coates and Favel 2016, 24).  
 
Coates and Favel recognize that developing and implementing their recommendations is 
easier said than done but not entirely impossible. The political climate at the federal level is well 
suited to undertake a process of Indigenous focused co-policy development. More importantly, 
the point of their recommendations is to provide clarity around what UNDRIP and free prior and 
informed consent mean for Canada’s Indigenous peoples and Canadians. Indigenous peoples 
need to define what consent means to them and how it should be undertaken. Otherwise, they 
argue, there will be persistent roadblocks with moving resource and economic development 
forward in Canada. 
 The co-development process Coates and Favel describe provides some helpful insight 
into how Canada’s New Public Management could be improved on to better suit First Nation 
communities. For instance, the development of a national or regional frameworks could include 
the development of relevant performance measures for First Nation program evaluation. While it 
still enables direct government oversight over First Nation communities, it gives First Nation 
communities and Indigenous organizations greater power in the evaluation process.  
The Trudeau government will be initiating consultation sessions with First Nation 
communities shortly to discuss Canada’s accountability relationship with them. This could be a 
real opportunity for Indigenous peoples and organizations to shape the development of a future 
administrative framework that enables and supports their self-determination. It will not be easy 
and there is bound to be resistance by various groups but these difficult discussions must happen, 
grievances need to aired, and the government needs to be patient.  We, collectively as a country, 
should not turn away from having tough discussions simply because they are difficult. Canada’s 
democratic institutions are inefficient and no longer serving the interests of all Canadians.  
Indigenous peoples are suffering unnecessarily. It is time to move Canada further away from the 
shackles of its paternalistic past and move into an era that is defined by its partnership and 
collaboration with Indigenous peoples.  
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ADDENDA 
 
Addendum 1: INAC Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
Question #1: Please tell me your name and your position. 
 
Question #2: How long have you been in your current role, and how long have you been with 
Indigenous Affairs and Northern Development Canada (INAC)? 
 
Question #3: Tell me a little bit about your role, what you do, some of your responsibilities, and 
what brought you to INAC.  
 
Reporting Requirements 
 
Question #1: Please walk me through some of the major steps INAC has taken to streamline 
program reporting requirements for First Nation communities since the Auditor General’s last 
update in February 2014.   
 
a) Have these efforts reduced the overall number of reporting requirements for First Nation 
communities—yes or no, and why?  
 
b) Approximately how many federal reports are required from the average First Nation 
community?  
 
c) Do you have anything further you would like to add? 
 
Balance of Federal Government Accountability and Local Autonomy 
 
Question #1: Please describe acceptable accountability standards that INAC administrators look 
for in First Nation communities when developing funding agreements. 
 
a) Do you have anything further you would like to add? 
 
Question #2:  Did First Nation community authority over financial and administrative policies 
increase or decrease over the last ten years? Do you agree or disagree, and why?  
 
Question #3: Would you describe some of the Indigenous accountability policies implemented 
over the last ten years as bureaucratically based or performance evaluation based, or a mix of 
both? 
 
a) What are some examples of current bureaucratic federal Indigenous accountability 
policies? 
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b) Some mainstream commentators in the media characterize the First Nation Financial 
Transparency Act (FNFTA) as a top-down bureaucratic measure—would you agree or 
disagree, and why? 
 
c) Do you have anything further you would like to add? 
 
Participatory Governance  
 
Question #1: Are any digital technologies used with First Nation communities to solicit their 
participation in federal policy development concerning their governance? (E.g. participatory 
budgeting; participatory decision making such as virtual town halls and consultations). 
 
a) If so, how would you describe its prevalence—very prevalent, somewhat prevalent, or 
not very prevalent?   
 
Question #2: Do you see a future role for or growth in digital technology in strengthening First 
Nation community participation in federal policy development concerning their governance—
yes or no, and why?  
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Addendum 2: 2010 Assembly of First Nations Resolution on Accountability and Transparency 
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Source: Assembly of First Nations, 2010 
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Addendum #3: INAC’s Funding Approaches under the New Transfer Payments Policy 
Funding  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approach 
Treatment of Unspent Funds Redirection of Funding To Other 
Programs or Projects During 
Agreement 
Criteria for 
AANDC Recovery of 
Funding 
Grant Can be retained by the recipient Grant is to be used for any expenditure related 
to the purpose, activity or initiative being 
funded. 
Recipient becomes ineligible 
Set 
Contribution 
 
Returned at end of each year Funds are to be expended as identified in the 
funding agreement. Cannot be redirected to 
other programs or projects. 
Funding is unspent or spent on 
ineligible items 
Fixed 
Contribution 
Aboriginal 
recipients only 
Returned annually unless used in the 
next year in the same program. 
Can also be kept and used in other 
areas if a plan outlining the activities 
to be undertaken with the unspent 
funds is approved by the department 
prior to use. 
Funds are to be expended as identified in the 
funding agreement. Cannot be redirected to 
other programs or projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
A plan is not provided/not 
approved where required, or 
Funding is not spent within 
timeline, or is spent on 
ineligible items 
  
 
6
0
 
Flexible 
Contribution 
Aboriginal 
recipients only 
Carried forward each fiscal year 
during the agreement or the project; 
and returned at end of agreement or 
project whichever comes first 
Funds are to be expended as identified in the 
funding agreement and cannot be redirected to 
other programs or projects. Funds may be 
redirected between cost categories in the 
project as defined in the funding agreement. 
Funding is unspent at the end 
of project or agreement or is 
spent on ineligible items 
Block 
Contribution 
Aboriginal 
recipients only 
Can be kept if used for activities in 
the block. 
Can also be kept for other activities 
outside the block if a plan outlining 
the activities to be undertaken with 
the unspent funds is approved by the 
department prior to use 
Redirection of funding is allowed among any 
and all programs included in the block during 
the life of the agreement, subject to delivery 
standards being met. 
 
A plan is not provided/not 
approved where required, or 
Funding is not spent within 
timeline, or is spent on 
ineligible items 
Source: Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, 2011b 
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Addendum #4: Exemption Certificate 
 
 
